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THE VITAL COMMON LAW: ITS ROLE IN A STATUTORY AGE 
M. Stuart   add en* 
"[Tlhe common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamiswits 
ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just 
and fair solutions to pressing societal problems."' 
This article discusses the common law, the judge-made law of property, 
contracts, torts and beyond. Common law observers and commentators have 
been rightly jarred by the claim of professional, academic and judicial 
authors who state that the common law is dead, or at least in retreat;* that 
* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author 
expresses his appreciation to Professor David G. Owen for his beneficial comments, and to 
Matthew Ross and Kemberly Weston for their valuable research assistance. 
1. Hamson v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 903 (Md. 1983) 
(citing Felder v. Butler, 438 A.2d 494 (Md. App. 1981)), quoted with approval in Kelley v. 
R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1150 (Md. 1985). 
2. Academic authors periodically announce the death, or at least the paralysis, of one 
or another common law doctrines. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 
(1974); Conference: Is the Common Law Dead? University of Maine School of Law (1977) 
[hereinafter Maine Conference]; Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy and the First 
Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS L.J. 1, 85 (1995) ("The consequence of [the 
described electoral] regulation has been substantially to diminish the parties' 'nearly 
autonomous common law status."'(citation omitted)); Calvin R. Dexter & Teresa J. 
Schwarzenbart, Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Common Law 
of Water Pollution, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 627; Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: 
Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 391 (1995) 
("When the liberal Court rejected Lochner, it implicitly rejected the view that property rights 
are natural rights that exist independently of government action in favor of the recognition 
that property rights are created by the common law, which is merely one of many possible 
regulatory system regimes. The resulting erosion of the common-law constitutional baseline 
was consistent with liberal ideology.") 
CJ, Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem 
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992). As to the statutory impetus for these 
phenomena, see e.g., Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, 81 A.B.A. J. 56, 57 (Aug. 
1995), quoting Prof. David G. Owen as observing that "tort law has been changed in a 
variety of significant ways in many states," and noting particularly "substantial alteration" 
to the basic doctrines of products liability and medical malpractice. The author states further 
that "[mlany reformers claim that federal legislation is the only way to bring uniformity to 
the patchwork structure of 50 different state tort systems." Id. at 58. 
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we live in a "statutory era";3and that the "orgy of ~tatutemaking,'~ state and 
federal, since 1960 effectively occludes the common law hor i~on .~  
This pessimistic vision is that of a common law marginalized, 
relegated to the desuetude of a secondary role in American jurisprudence; 
the common law as a test track for eventual statutory solutions6 or a lexicon 
for statutory terms;' the common law as background music for a modem 
statutory lyric. 
Most would describe this as an ignominious path for the once dominant 
common law tradition, one that for 800 years has alternately woven and 
cobbled together the custom and morality of English speaking nations into 
the fairest dispute resolution mechanism ever devised. Even so, advocates 
of the robust common law role must concede that (1) the common law, with 
its "principles . . . embedded in masses of report[ed] cases, [and] not always 
to be reconciled with an~ther,"~ does not rise to the level of a rudimentary 
or even proto-science; (2) the system of common law judging vests 
enormous power in presiding judges, a power that can lead to unseemly 
subjectivity in interpreting law to apply that may be at quite a remove from, 
although frequently more progressive than, contemporary societal percep- 
tions of j u~ t i ce ;~  and (3) a jury's prerogatives on such important issues as 
damages can lead to results not easily squared with proven loss, and can 
occasionally be openly hostile to business." 
There is no substantial dispute that common law adjudication has 
experienced a "revolution" in the twentieth century." The issue is whether 
3. Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The 
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875 (1991). 
4. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES. 169 (Harvard 
1982) [hereinafter CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES] (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF 
AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977)). 
5. The vigor of statutory development is not exclusively a twentieth century 
phenomenon. At least as early as the late nineteenth century, "utilitarian" jurists 
"concentrate[d] on codification as the instrument of legal reform." RICHARD A. COSGROVE, 
OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMUNITY 1870-1930, 39 
(1987) [hereinafter COSGROVE, OUR LADY]. 
6. E.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-15-07(A)(1995)(public nuisance). 
7. E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 5 9601, 9607(b)(3) (1994) (due care standard for third-party 
defenses regarding hazardous waste disposal). 
8. COSGROVE, OUR LADY, supra note 5, at 39. 
9. CJ, Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision of 
Comparative Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 330 (1994) (judge's decisions 
may be "subject to influence by his or her own personal predilections"). 
10. See, e.g., Charles Allen, Lawsuit Fight Over More Than Spilled Coffee, PHOENIX 
GAZETTE, March 29, 1995, at B-9. 
11. Justice Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address, 
43 U .  PIIT. L. REV. 995 (1982). Justice Peters estimated that only ten percent of the cases 
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that revolution has been prudent and progressive, or nihilistic. Has the 
common law itself become more scientific, or are efforts to assign a science 
to it, as one critic put it, "crude Baconianism at best,"I2 a supernal ipse 
dixit? Has the common law of the latter twentieth century ratified or 
repudiated Roscoe Pound's admission that "[a] composite of the law of 
[then] forty-eight American states cannot, in the nature of things, be the 
logical unity in which Langdell believed"?I3 
This article, developed from the 1996 James D. Hopkins Lecture, will 
open by summarizing the antecedents and historical role of the common law, 
and in so doing describe the accepted common law doctrinal g o a l ~ o m e  
moral, some economic, but each in its way pragmatic. The discussion will 
not attempt to assign ascendancy, much less victory, to one or more of the 
common law objectives, as each, and all together, are essential to gaining 
an integrated understanding to the common law's modern contribution.14 
The article continues by giving some detail to the common law decision 
making, a process the author describes as one of enlightened gradualism, 
resourcefulness and adaptability. Specific examples of this process at work 
will be drawn from the common law of contract, domestic relations, torts, 
criminal law and evidence. 
Critical to this analysis will be a development of the distinctions 
between common law and statutory approaches, including their respective 
strengths and the weakness, in policy objectives and in application. The 
article will conclude with my prognosis of the health of the common law as 
we enter the twenty-first century. 
before her Connecticut Supreme Court were "purely common law," with statutes being 
"relevant [to] if not determinative" of the balance. Id. at 996. 
12. "[Tlhe Baconian scientists of the first part of the nineteenth century believed that 
their research revealed truth. Indeed, their work was revelation. The principles they 
adumbrated were real and true because, in the end, they were expressions of the Creator." 
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 32 (Oxford 1994). 
13. COSGROVE, OUR LADY, supra note 5, at 37 (quoting Roscoe Pound to Pollack (May 
23, 1934), in ROSCOE POUND PAPERS, Haward Law School Library). 
14. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL . REV. 
901 (1982) ("Fierce debates have raged in recent years over the objectives reflected in the 
tort-law system. A growing nuinber of observers insist that tort law reflects efforts to 
achieve allocative efficiency and wealth maximization. A somewhat smaller, but no less 
intensely committed number insist that tort law primarily reflects fairness concerns." 
(citations omitted)). Id. at 901. 
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11. THE MODERN INTERFACE OF STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
A. Generally 
Let us define our subject. What is the common law? It represents the 
largest proportion of the law of property,  contract^'^ and torts.16 The 
common law is often called "judge-made" law, to distinguish it from 
statutes, regulations and ordinances, which are enacted by state and federal 
legislatures, agencies and political subdivisions. Richard Posner describes 
common law broadly as "any body of law created primarily through judges 
by their decisions rather than by the framers of statutes or constitutions,"" 
and "the body of English and American judge-made rules, many of great 
antiquity, governing torts (civil wrongs that result in personal injury or 
property damage), contracts, property, crimes, and many other fields of 
private c~nduct ." '~  In 1821, Maryland's Chief Judge Chase described it 
more elegantly as "a system of jurisprudence founded on the immutable 
principles of justice, and denominated by the great luminary of the law of 
England, the perfection of reas~n.'"~ Lastly and functionally, Arthur Corbin 
suggests that the common law is not so grand, luminescent or sacred as 
15. This observation depends in part upon acceptance of the characterization of the 
Uniform Commercial Code as a crystallization of the common law of sales, negotiable 
instruments, secured interests, and the like. 
See discussion of Charles Fried's "moral institution" theory of contract doctrine as 
"based on the moral obligation to keep one's promises . . . and that contract's doctrines 
reflect that obligation[,]" in Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: 
Reflections on a Theory of Contract, 41 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 925, 926 & n.9, 970 (1987); see 
also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(1981). 
16. Of the relationship between American common law and its forebear, English 
common law, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote: 
The common law consists of judicial opinions and as such they are only 'evidence 
of what is common law;' the law and the opinions of the judges are not always 
convertible terms (Jones' Blackstone, p. 122). Our [New Jersey] Constitution 
does not obligate the courts of this state to follow or adopt the reasoning and 
decisions of the English common law courts. It is the principles of the common 
law which we in common with most of the states have adopted generally, and not 
necessarily the decisions of the English courts in exposition of the common law. 
New Jersey v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715, 720 (N.J. 1957) (quoting Heise v. Earle, 35 A.2d 880, 
885 (N.J. 1943)). 
17. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247 (1990) [hereinafter 
POSNER, PROBLEMS]. 
18. WILLIAM . LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW vii (1987) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]. 
19. Allen v. State, 605 A.2d 960, 966 (Md. App. 1992), (quoting State v. Buchanan, 5 
H.& J. 317, 362 (1821)(Chase, C.J., separate opinion)). 
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some state. To Corbin, "[tlhe common law is not a body of rules; it is a 
method. It is the creation of law by the inductive process."20 
Whatever individual or aggregate definition you accept, today you 
cannot understand American law regarding a broad subject, be it privacy, 
employment relations or environmental harm, by looking solely at statutes, 
or solely at the common law. The symbiosis between common law doctrine 
and statutory law pervades our jurisprudence. In most circumstances, the 
state or federal statute is concerned only with enforcement of state public 
policy, civil or criminal, and leaves individual pursuit of monetary or 
injunctive relief to existing common law.2' In many settings, such as 
privacy,22 products liability,23 or public nuisance,24 state statutes essay to 
codify common law causes of action, conserving them, either conservatively 
or progressively, as the vehicle for personal actions for money damages or 
injunctive relief. In still other matters, a defendant's conformity with a 
statutory standard may either hinder or preclude a plaintiffs common law 
claim;25 while noncompliance with a statutory standard may all but 
vouchsafe a plaintiffs suit for damages.26 
20. COSGROVE, OUR LADY, supra note 5, at 33 (quoting ARTHUR L. CORBIN, WHAT IS 
THE COMMON LAW? 75). 
21. E.g., Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. $ 1319(c)(l)(B) (1994). 
22. E.g., N. Y. Clv. RIGHTS LAW $$ 50, 51 (McKimey 1995) (statutory right of 
privacy) discussed in Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 
1953) (involving defendant's alleged invasion of "plaintiffs exclusive right" to use 
photographs of baseball players). 
23. For example, state statutes in Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee and Washington "bar 
an action for strict [products] liability depending on whether jurisdiction may be obtained 
against the manufacturer and whether the manufacturer is able to satisfy a judgment." 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY $ I crnt. e, Reporters' 
Note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No.21. 
24. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 36-601(A) (1995) (setting forth "conditions" that 
constitute 'public nuisances dangerous to the public health";) OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-15- 
07-(A)(1995), stating as follows: 
[Tlhe emission or escape into the open air from any source or sources whatsoever, 
of smoke, ashes, dust, dirt, grime, acids, fumes, vapors, odors, or any other 
substances, or combination of substances, in such a manner or in such amounts 
as to endanger the health, safety or welfare of the public, or cause unreasonable 
injury or damage to the health, safety or welfare of the public, is hereby found 
and declared to be a public nuisance. 
Id. 
25. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 23, $ 7(b) ("Effects of Compliance and Non- 
compliance with Applicable Products Safety Statutes or Regulations"). 
26. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 23, $ 7a. 
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B. Distinctions Between Statutory and Common Law 
For their frequent coalescence, there exist important distinctions 
between statutory law and common law. I will describe some of the 
prominent discriminating markers. 
From the beginning, customary law or common law operated 
independently of the development of political rights, which give rise to 
"public law." In the nineteenth century, the "jurisprudential roots" 
distinguishing the common law from statutory law, a conceptual segregation 
of so called "private law" from "public law," permitted the conclusion that 
common law pertained to protection of pre-political rights, such as those 
involving property or autonomy interests, against personal injury or property 
10~s.~' Public law, in turn, "consisted of government compulsions restricting 
private freedom[,]"28 while the common law identified and protected private 
freedom and autonomy. Over time, we will see preservation of individual 
freedom and autonomy as the pole star of the developing common law. 
Accordingly, although in application statutory and common law 
approaches sometimes converge, blurring the distinctions between the 
the roles of statutory and common law are differentiable. Conventionally, 
legislatures have been considered responsible for effecting public policy 
through the passage of ex ante rules, while courts have occupied themselves 
with entry of ex post justice between private litigank3' By ex ante 
legislative rules is meant rules of prospective application, such as a statute 
requiring a manufacturer to report a product that creates or may create a 
substantial product ha~ard .~ '  Ex post rules of law entered by judges 
applying the common law typically evaluate disputes, injuries or losses 
already suffered, and resolve the issue of where the loss should finally 
rest-with the injured party or the actor. In common law matters, prior to 
acting it may not be crystal clear to individuals whether their actions will 
incur liability, for example, whether their statements are defamatory, whether 
they may peaceably repossess property, or whether they may erect a fence 
that obscures their neighbor's view. This uncertainty has given rise to 
acerbic observations like that of Jeremy Bentham, who wrote: "Common 
law judges make law as a man makes laws for his dog. When a dog does 
27. Indeed, aspects of common law tort are thought to antedate not only early statutes 
but even the modem state. LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at 1 .  
28. Farber & Frickey, supra note 3, at 886 (emphasis added). 
29. Id. at 876. The authors comment upon the increased and confessed policy making 
pursuits and ex ante approaches of common law courts. 
30. Id. 
31. Consumer Product Safety Act $ 15, 15 U.S.C. 8 2064 (1994). 
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anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then you 
beat him for it."32 
Another distinguishing characteristic of common law is that it is 
conceptual, while statutory law can be described as textuaLJ3 This distinction 
is played out in the markedly different tasks before the court applying 
statutory law as opposed to applying common law. In Posner's words, 
"tilust as statutory concepts must be justified by demonstrating their 
provenance in statutory texts, so common law concepts must be justified by 
demonstrating their provenance in sound public policy."34 
Accordingly, unlike a statute, the common law permits a contextual 
evaluation of conduct. This is to say that the judge's inquiry does not end 
at reaching an answer as to whether the defendant's conduct was prohibited, 
or permitted, by the state. Rather, the inquiry involves evaluation of 
whether the conduct conformed with, or exceeded, the developed and 
normative standards of the common law. In property law the contextual 
inquiry might be whether a landowner's use of her property is compatible 
with customary neighboring uses. In tort law the question might be whether 
the defendant acted as we would expect a reasonable man, or whether the 
injured plaintiff took ordinary precautions to protect himself from harm. 
To hypothesize, if we were to have a statute, or a regulation pursuant 
to a statute, defining the proper method of taking one's seat when operating 
ride-on farm equipment, an operator injured after falling off equipment 
while operating it from a standing position would, we can suppose, find any 
potential tort recovery reduced or eliminated because of this departure from 
the statutory standard of care. Under the common law of torts, however, the 
evaluation of the operator's conduct would be ~ontex tua l .~~  A contextual 
32. Jeremy Bentham, quoted in LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 93 (1983). 
33. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 247. 
34. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 249. By way of example, there are salient 
differences between the structure and workings of the common law system pertaining to 
environmental torts and the structure of statutory environmental laws. As summarized by 
Professor Gerald W. Boston and the author: 
The law of nuisance consists of general, broad and abstract principles of 
unreasonable interferences, applicable to any activity. The regulatory structure, 
in contrast, is highly particularized, detailed and expected to govern well-defined 
kinds of activity. 1n nuisance, plaintiffs rights are exclusively determined by 
courts of general jurisdiction. To be contrasted, the regulatory structure is drafted, 
enforced and adjudicated within regulatory agencies and under the supervision of 
officials commanding technical expertise in particular, and often quite specialized, 
areas of regulation. 
GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC 
TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 2 13-2 14 (West 1994). 
35. "The question what a prudent man would do under given circumstances is then 
equivalent to the question what are the teachings of experience to the dangers of this or that 
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approach would permit, though not require, a fact finder to conclude that it 
was unreasonable for a middle-aged Brookfield, Connecticut ophthalmologist 
to operate a rider-mower in a standing position, but perhaps reasonable for 
an experienced thirty-year-old Iowa farm employee to do so on a thresher. 
An additional distinction between common law and statutory regimes 
is their respective responsiveness to development, amendment, or with- 
drawal. A trial court's entry of an improvident common law interpretation 
is subject to one or often two tiers of appellate review. A judge's unwar- 
ranted constriction or enlargement of rules can be corrected. Where a state's 
high court has countenanced a new rule, the political process, provides for 
a legislative veto.36 Because of their prerogatives to turn aside rules whose 
former utility cannot be demonstrated in a modem setting, common law 
judges can discard outdated rules with far greater ease than outdated 
legislation can be set aside.37 
111. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FOIBLES 
A. Statutory Shortcomings 
There are demonstrable limitations to both statutory and common law 
approaches. I begin with observations about the limitations of statutory 
approaches. 
Statutes do not readily distinguish hues. As a general proposition, a 
statutory solution is confined by the four corners of the statute's language. 
As the British authority, Craies, put it in Statute Law, "a statute may not be 
extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not 
conduct under these or those circumstances; and as the teachings of experience are matters 
of fact, it is easy to see why the jury should be consulted with regard to them." OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 150 (1923) [hereinafter HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW]. 
36. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985). 
37. As Wheeler, J., concurring, wrote in Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 92 A. 883, 891 
(Conn. 19 15): 
The court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew 
up in a remote generation may in the fbllness of experience be found to serve 
another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that 
another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and 
settled judgment of society, and considerable property rights have become vested 
in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus great writers upon the common law have 
discovered the source and method of its growth, and in its growth found its health 
and life. It is not and should not be stationary. Change of this character should 
not be left to the Legislature. 
Id. 
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been made."38 As conduct is either approved or forbidden, generally there 
is no opportunity for equitable adjustment of the conflicting interests, or for 
consideration of the comparative responsibility of opposing parties for the 
harm or inequity. 
- - 
A concomitant limitation is that where a statute specifically describes 
an approach or remedy to be taken by the court, it will admit of no 
departure from it. The problems with the inflexibility of such an approach 
have been manifest in the recent application of the Federal Sentencing 
~ u i d e l i n e s , ~ ~  requiring sentences of definite ranges to be given defendants 
filling certainbright line criteria. The appalling inappropriateness of some 
of the required sentencing, and the incapacity of the sentencing judge to 
consider the exigencies of particular cases in fashioning a sentence, have led 
at least one federal trial judge to deflect statutory sentencing  restriction^.^^ 
Statutory responses to societal problems are also vulnerable to what 
Locke called "the dangers of enthu~iasm,'~' and the invariable fellow 
traveller of enthusiasm, haste.42 In contemporary terms, what better example 
38. P. S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting 
CRAIES ON STATUTE LAW 102) [hereinafter Atiyah, Common Law]. 
39. See The Comprehensive Federal Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. $$ 3551- 
3693 (1994), 28 U.S.C. $5 991-998 (1994). The underlying Senate Report stated the goal 
of the statute as the elimination of "unwarranted dispar[ities]] and uncertainty" in sentencing. 
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Congress, 1st Sess. 49 (1983) (discussed in Symposium, The Tennessee 
Supreme Court: Judicial Activists?, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 297 & n.2 (1994). 
40. Peter Bowles, Judge Ignores Ruling, NEWSDAY. Dec. 3, 1994, at A-26 ("Utilizing 
a loophole in the law, U.S. District Court Judge Jack Weinstein this week ignored a higher- 
court mandate to sentence an admitted heroin addict to 10 years in prison and instead 
imposed the 26 months she already had served."). Id. 
In a June 4, 1994 column, journalist Nat Henthoff quotes District Court Judge Jack 
Weinstein as stating that the sentencing guidelines "require, in the main, cruel imposition of 
excessive sentences." Nat Henthoff, Judge Breyer: Lots of Room for Dissent, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, June 4, 1994, at A-19. 
41. Locke wrote: 
Enthusiasm, though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising 
from the conceits of a warmed or over-weening brain, works yet, where it once 
gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men than either 
of those two, or both together, men being most forwardly obedient to the impulses 
they receive from themselves; and the whole man is sure to act more vigorously, 
where the whole man is carried by a natural motion. For strong conceit, like a 
new principle, canies all easily with it, when got above common sense, and freed 
of all restraint of reason, and check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine 
authority, in concurrence with our own temper and imagination." 
JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE SELECTIONS 17 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed., 1956). 
42. In THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS, in the chapter titled "A Law of 
Acceleration," Adams writes, "In every age man has bitterly and justly complained that 
nature hurried and hustled him[.]" HENRY BROOKS ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY 
ADAMS 493 (1946) [hereinafter EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS]. 
A corollary of haste is inattention to detail. Richard Posner writes: 
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of the perilous "enthusiasm" described by Locke is available than in the 
realm of recent hastily-considered and unseasoned limitations upon the 
government's ability to promulgate land use restrictions in the public 
interest? A growing number of states have passed legislation requiring that 
the state or governmental subdivision provide compensation to landowners 
for restrictions on their use of land, in many settings where the landowner's 
use historically has been proscribable under the doctrine of public 
nuisance.43 Representative is the Florida statute, entitled the "Private 
Property Rights Protection Act," providing sweepingly that "[wlhen a 
specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an 
existing use of real property * * * the property owner * * * is entitled to 
relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market 
value of the real property caused by the action of 
Such statutes provide an alarming example of the risks of the 
sometimes hasty legislative and political process, as they hobble the 
effectiveness of land use regulation by levying upon the state a monetary 
cost to what was previously a simpler public interest predicate for such 
restrictions. Let us imagine a Maryland state environmental agency contem- 
plating a public nuisance initiative against a Chesapeake Bay marina 
operator whose jet ski rentals cause shore erosion, damage oyster beds, and 
disturb the serenity of migratory fowl. Regulations pursuant to historical 
public nuisance authority would not require compensation to the marina 
operator. 
If, in contrast, Maryland had a law such as Florida's, the agency could 
no longer be guided solely by considerations of whether requiring the 
marina operator to moderate this land use will serve the public interest, or 
is in furtherance of state public nuisance authority to enjoin activities 
corrosive to the public health, welfare and safety, a conventional zoning and 
The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is not 
that they are poorly drafted- though many a r ~ n d  not that the legislators failed 
to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the s ta tutdhough often they 
do fail-but that a statue necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with imperfect 
appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application. 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretationin the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U .  
C H I .  L. REV. 800, 81 1 (1983). 
43. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $$ 9-500.12, 9-500.13, 11-810, 11-81 1 (1995); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. $ 24-68-105(1)(1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3184 (1995); IDAHO CODE $ 67- 
8001 - 8003 (1995); 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 2015; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 3:3621-3624 
(1995); N.D. CENT. CODE $ 42-01-06 (1995); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. $ 2007 (West 1995); 
VA. CODE ANN. $ 9-6.14:7 (Michie 1995); WYO. STAT. $ 9-5-301 to 9-5-305 (1995). 
44. H.B. 863, 1995, Reg. Sess., 1995 Fla. H.B. 863, available in LEXIS Legis Library, 
Sttext File. The statute defines "existing use" as including "reasonably foreseeable" uses. 
Id. at $ (2)(b). 
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public nuisance balancing of individual hardship and public interest. Under 
such new land use regulations, the regulator's pragmatic concern will be 
largely financial, for example, whether the state of Maryland is prepared to 
pay the marina operator the $1 million or more her attorneys will demand 
in just compensation. It requires no elaboration to recognize that such 
legislation acts as a strong disincentive to those charged with protecting the 
environment. 
What are the legislative enthusiasms that pennit such laws to be passed, 
and how is it that they prevail over widespread public commitment to 
environmental protection? The answer is found in simple principles of 
political economy. In the Florida setting, a large proportion of Florida 
residents own or aspire to own property. They can readily imagine land use 
initiatives, by the law of public nuisance, a clean water act or otherwise, that 
will trammel their prerogatives to use their land as they wish. In contrast 
to this sprawling, politically alert, and anxious proportion of the electorate, 
only a small and politically inefficient number of Florida residents have 
reflected deliberately upon the predicament such compensation statutes 
create for this generation and the next. 
Another example of improvident legislative enthusiasm might be the 
push during the 104th Congress for a so-called "loser pays" approach to 
civil litigation. For years tort reform proponents have discussed various 
"loser pays" approaches, whereby a losing plaintiff, or one who rejects a 
settlement offer that turns out to be more generous than his ultimate reward, 
if any, would be liable for some measure of the opposing party's marginal 
counsel fees. H.R. 10, the Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, had 
such a provision, applicable to suits brought in state courts and alleging 
violation of state liability laws. Apart from the gross overinclusiveness of 
such approaches, in that they would deter frivolous litigation only by means 
of discouraging much meritorious litigation, a loser pays protocol represents 
a "fee shifting" approach which has been demonstrated repeatedly to be 
ineffective, inefficient, and unfair in working its purported goal.45 
- - - 
45. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply With the Law, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1993); Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co. 
Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U .  L. REV. 134 1 ,  1439 (1995); Peter 
Charles Coharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J .  ON REG. 
435, 525 & n.142 (1995); Clinton F. Beckner, I11 & Averly Katz, The Incentive Effects of 
Litigation Fee Shifting When Legal Standards are Uncertain, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 205 
(1995) ("Our analysis shows that when legal standards are administered imperfectly, the 
efficiency of fee shifting is a problem of the second best. . . . We conclude that just as there 
is no reason to believe that the British rule generally reduces the procedural costs of 
litigation, there is also no good reason to think that it generally promotes efficient substantive 
behavior."). 
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While statutory solutions may be improvidently hasty, they may also 
arrive too late in the day. A statutory answer is not normally sought until 
a problem has erupted in the public consciousness, when a societal dilemma 
has achieved such a level of gravity and tenacity that "social convention" 
demands "community voting."46 As Benjamin Cardozo observed, "[alll 
history demonstrates that legislation intervenes only when a definite abuse 
has disclosed itself, through the excess of which public feeling has finally 
been aroused.'*' In contrast, the common law judge is not encumbered by 
any political need that a critical mass of public concern have been reached 
before justice can be entered in an individual case: The common law judge 
must consider and resolve a societal conflict when presented early in its 
maturation. With neither a governing statute nor a controlling common law 
rule, the judge can nevertheless enter a judgment illuminated by the 
refracted light of parallel or related common law principles. In so doing, in 
Professor Marshall Shapo7s words, the common law judge "semiconsciously 
capture[s] society's ideas about justice in legal issues framed by specific 
disp~tes.'*~ 
A related shortcoming of the statutory approach is that statutes typically 
have no provision for the subtle and particularized application of accepted 
principles to individual circumstances, a model Professor John Siliciano 
describes as one of "individualized justice.ldg Dean John Wade wrote that 
unlike common law tort decisions, which "requir[e] a careful and judicious 
balancing of the conflicting interests of the various parties," legislation 
typically involves "tradeoffs" which "can produce varying results that may 
combine to establish a reasonably fair average, but the average often comes 
from many specific instances in which one or the other party is treated 
~nfairly."'~ Accepting the necessity of such tradeoffs, statutes are notorious 
for omitting to state clearly their rationale, and thus attorneys and judges are 
often left adrift in determining a statute's applicability." 
46. Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us 
About the American Experience, 89 Nw. U .  L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1995). 
47. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 144 (Yale 1921) 
[hereinafter CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS]. 
48. Shapo, supra note 46, at 1569. 
49. John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1820 (1987) [hereinafter Siliciano]. 
50. John J.  Wade, Book Review, 47 LA. L. REV. 691 (1987) (reviewing WEX S. 
MALONE, ESSAYS ON TORTS (1987)). In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) 
(Stevens, J., concumng), Justice Stevens corroborated Dean Wades's assessment of  the 
legislative process, describing "governmental action" as "frequently the product of  
compromise, of collective decision making, and . . . of mixed motivation." 
51. McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 L. & CONTEMP. ROBS. 3, 13 (1994). 
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Finally, and with particular reference to the current state and congres- 
sional emphasis on statutory alteration of common law liability rules, it is 
not by any stretch clear that increased codification of the common law gains 
the commonality, uniformity or predictability that its proponents de~ i r e . ' ~  
In the words of tort observer Victor E. Schwartz: "The fact is that over the 
past twenty years state tort law has grown further apart, not closer together. 
The advent of so-called 'tort reform' has augmented this trend. This year 
alone, approximately one dozen states have enacted tort reform statutes; yet 
none of them are the same. A nuance in any one of them could be major 
and outcome determinati~e."'~ 
In the end, as Professor Lawrence M. Friedman writes, "the legislative 
process is neither as good at accommodating everybody as some have 
thought, nor as elitist and undemocratic as the worst of the cynics has 
described it. Rather, it is rough, complex and imperfe~t."'~ 
B. Common Law Shortcomings 
What is a clear-eyed look at the inherent limitations of common law 
jurisprudence? A primary objection to modem common law development, 
and an impetus for current statutory modification, is that, in crafting a 
remedy, the common law judge has no meaningful disincentive to the 
temptation to subtly gratify his or her own philosophical or social predilec- 
tions. An element of this is unassailably true,s5 and it may be that in the 
52. Cj, Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Fault: Variety and Uniformity in 
Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986). 
53. Victor E. Schwartz, 'Class Action' Reform: Endless Clashes of Values of 
Constructive Results?, MASS TORT LITIG. REP., Aug. 1995, *3. Schwartz states: 
As someone who has studied the law of torts for a while, I am troubled by 
generalizations about tort law being 'in common' throughout the United States. 
The pressure to more litigation forward for the 'round-up' tend to lead even the 
most thoughtfbl of judges to see American tort law as somehow capable of being 
placed in a Cuisinart(TM), where differences of law are lost in a blended product 
that somehow represents both plaintiff and defendant interests. 
Id. at *3. 
54. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 106 (1984). Professor Friedman 
continues: "Blacks and consumers have, for example, a much greater chance to win the ear 
of legislators than was true some fifty years ago." 
55. As Cardozo wrote: 
There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it 
philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. 
Judges cannot escape that current any more than other mortals. All their lives, 
forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging at 
them--inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the 
resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs, a sense in James' 
phrase of 'the total push and pressure of the cosmos,' which, when reasons are 
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natural law foundation of the common law we will find the basis for the 
modem criticism that judicial tinkering with common law principles invites, 
or even requires, manipulation of policy objectives, rules, and outcomes in 
order to harmonize results with the views of individual judges. After all, 
what could be more problematic than the question of what rights and 
obligations are the original and inalienable of modem men and women? 
As has been suggested, the common law is ideally suited to resolving 
claims arising at the borders of societal and business dynamics, whether the 
issue is promissory- estoppel or damages for emotional distress. Ironically, 
it is just this role of deciding cases at the margins of modem experience that 
enlarges the vulnerability of common law adjudication to the individual 
views of the sitting judge. A judge's own ideological gloss, the argument 
goes, is most likely to be detected where "preexisting doctrinal propositions 
do not provide a clear answer."56 Examples of modem causes of action in 
which unsettled doctrine has stimulated and will continue to stimulate the 
normative orientations of sitting judges are the developing law affecting the 
old, but now eroding, doctrine of employment at will, and the gestational 
rights of children in ~tero . '~  
Common law courts are also criticized for the sometimes seemingly 
cavalier approach taken to the doctrine of stare decisis, i.e., the rule that 
courts should ordinarily follow the substantive rule of law recognized to that 
point by previous holdings of equal or higher courts in that jurisdiction. For 
its seemingly plain and overarching imperative, implementation of stare 
decisis has perplexed the finest legal .minds in common law history. 
Considering the role of stare decisis, Benjamin Cardozo ruminated: 
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of informa- 
tion do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them to 
contribute to the result? If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse 
to follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that 
will make a precedent for the future? If I am seeking logical consis- 
tency, the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At 
what point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some 
consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common standards 
of justice or morals?'" 
-- 
nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall. 
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 47, at 12. 
56. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Social Propositions and Common Law Adjudication, 1990 
U. ILL. L. REV. 23 1 ,  232 (reviewing MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON 
LAW (1988)). 
57. See infra notes 230-244 and accompanying text. See also TERRENCE F .  KIELY, 
MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE '90's $ 6.6 (1990). 
58. CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 47, at 10. Jurists have long recognized 
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Consistent with Cardozo's implicit thesis that common law decisions 
bear the stamp of judicial individualism, much of the modem common law 
vulnerability to statutory "correction" can be attributed to common law rules 
that are arguably, to use a baseball metaphor, "ahead of the curve" of the 
"community's sense of justice."59 For example, Professor Martin Kotler 
characterized recent and ongoing state and federal products liability reform 
as a statutory rebuff to so-called "strict" products liability, with the reform 
statutes showing a consistent commitment to returning liability rules to the 
older predicate finding of fault.60 
Further developing Professor Kotler's point, common law approaches 
may also be subject to statutory correction where there is neither public nor 
legislative consensus that the common law rule satisfies an instrumentalist 
objectivean objective either to encourage worthy conduct, or to deter 
harmful or wasteful conduct. An example of a common law rule with a 
precarious instrumentalist basis might be the widespread common law rule 
that nonmanufacturing sellers are subject to liability without fault, or strict 
products liability, even though most wholesalers and retailers are not parties 
to the design process or the crafting of warnings or instructions for products, 
and thus are not in a position to efficiently remove unsafe p r o d u c t ~ t  least 
not prior to an accident-r to influence better behavior on the part of their 
manufacturing suppliers. One cannot, therefore, be surprised that recent 
that precedent is a necessary, but not sufficient, source of the law. Cardozo wrote: 
I do not mean that precedents are ultimate sources of the law, supplying the sole 
equipment that is needed for the legal armory, the sole tools, to borrow 
Maitland's phrase, "in the legal smithy." Back of precedents are the basic 
juridical conceptions which are the postulates of judicial reasoning, and farther 
back are the habits of life, the institutions of society, in which these conceptions 
had their origin. 
Id. at 19. 
59. Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive Model of the 
Development of Tort Doctrine, 58  U .  CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1240 (1990) (citations omitted). 
60. Id. at 1239. Using the example of statutory abrogation of strict liability rules in 
products liability, Kotler explains: 
Given that there probably has never been a social consensus in favor of the 
instrumentalist values underlying strict liability in tort for defective products, the 
wave of product liability reform legislation proposed or enacted within the past 
few years was probably inevitable. Although some features of this body of 
legislation appear to be solely a product of industry lobbying, it is worth noting 
that the most important features serve to immunize defendants from liability 
where the harm caused cannot fairly be said to have been their fault. This 
legislative insistence on the existence of fault as a condition for the imposition of 
liability is serving to bring tort doctrine back into line with the community's sense 
of justice. 
Id. at 1239-40. 
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proposed products liability reform legislation would in most circumstances 
return the negligence standard to products liability for nonmanufacturing 
 seller^.^' The bills recently before both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate recognize the unfairness and illogic of imposing "strict" liability 
upon retailers and wholesalers who neither participate in the design process 
for products they sell, nor create warnings or instructions for a product. 
Noteworthy is the parallel readjustment occumng in the American Law 
Institute's draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, a 
reinterpretation taking place a mere thirty years following publication of its 
strict products liability provision, Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 402A. 
The proposed Restatement tethers a finding of design or informational 
(warnings) defects to a risk-utility analysis that hlly examines the prudence, 
foresight, and vigor of a manufacturer's conduct.62 In all settings but the 
primitive manufacturing defect, liability will no longer be "strict" in any 
important sense, but rather tied to a manufacturer's failure to conform to 
society's expectation of a manufacturer's professionalism, or conversely the 
manufacturer's substandard, 'blameworthy or culpable conduct. 
While common law responses may have been ahead of the curve in a 
doctrine such as strict products liability, elsewhere the common law has 
been behind the curve, or tardy, in its incremental response to changing 
conditions. Professor David R. Hodas provides the illustration of the special 
61. S. 565, Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995 $ 5(a)(2), 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1995 
[hereinafter Fairness Act]. The Fairness Act adopts three liability standards for non- 
manufacturing sellers. There is liability where the claimant proves that: (1) the product 
causing the harm was sold by the defendant; (2) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable 
care; and (3) this failure to exercise reasonable care was a proximate cause of the claimant's 
harm. There may also be liability if the seller has given an express warranty, and, far less 
frequently, if the seller has engaged in intentional wrongdoing. 
The Fairness Act states that liability cannot be based solely upon "an alleged failure 
to inspect a product if the product seller had no reasonable opportunity to inspect the product 
that allegedly caused harm to the claimant." See generally Products Liability: Hearings on 
S. 565 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th Cong., 
2d Sess., 1995 WL 152027 (1995) (testimony of M. Stuart Madden). 
These observations are not intended to address potential liability issues raised by 
private labelers, such as Sears, who engage manufacturers to produce products under the 
Sears trademark or other trademarks proprietary to Sears. 
62. Reporters James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski explain the adoption of 
a risk-utility analysis for design defects and for warnings defects in $$ 2(a) & (b) in a Note 
comment reading in part: 
Scholarly commentary agrees overwhelmingly with the . . . risk-utility approach 
adopted. . . . See, e.g., MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY vol. 1 at 299 (2d ed. 
1988)("[T]he majority rule posits that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case 
of defective design without evidence of a technologically feasible, and practicable, 
alternative to defendant's product that was available at the time of manufacture.") 
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 23, $ 2, commentary at 83. 
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injury rule for bringing a claim in public nuisance. Describing the public 
nuisance private claimant's obligation to show a harm qualitatively different 
from that suffered by the public at Hodas states the while the 
special injury rule "may have made sense in an era when misuse of existing 
technology affected only people in the immediate vicinity," such concerns 
"pale in comparison to modem worries about an accident at a chemical 
plant . . . , [or] an oil These modem risks, which can cause severe 
and sprawling damages and which "prompted a revolution in statutory 
environmental law," Hodas notes, have spurred no similar reexamination of 
the restrictive special injury req~irement,~~ which indeed has been adopted 
in numerous state statutes treating public nuisance.66 
This review would not be complete without mention that while the 
common law has sometimes developed a right or a remedy that has yet to 
command significant public approval, it has also sometimes worked in 
seeming conflict with the development of progressive jurisprudence. Indeed, 
common law doctrine has often "worked . . . as a tool for those with 
sufficient resources to influence the legal ~ystem."~' During the 1950s and 
the early 1960s, the common law was employed by certain states "to 
sanction . . . discriminatory treatment.'y68 Moreover, many twentieth century 
statutory modifications of the common law were motivated by a desire to 
ameliorate the harshness of common law rules perceived as unfair to 
plaintiffs. An example is the Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1 9 0 8 , ~ ~  
which eliminated such common law bamers to railworker claims as 
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 821C(1) (1979), which provides that "[iln 
order to recover damages in an individual action for a public nuisance, one must have 
suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public 
exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of  interference." 
64. David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits 
for Relief From Environmental Harm, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833, 884 (1989). 
65. Id. at 884-85. 
66. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 4 3493 (West 1993) ("A private person may maintain an 
action for public nuisance if it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise."); ALA. 
CODE $ 6-5-123 (1993) ("If a public nuisance causes a special damage to an individual in 
which the public does not participate, such special damage gives a right of action."). 
The tendency towards stasis of judge-made common law may also stem from the 
processes in which judges are appointed, a process in which "the normal criteria of judicial 
fitness have been an eager acceptance of the American past rather than an eager interest in 
the American future." HAROLD J. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A COMMENTARY 
AND AN INTERPRETATION 31 (1949) [hereinafter LASKI, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY]. 
67. Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 
540 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
(1 982)). 
68. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 308 (1964). 
69. 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. $ 51-60). 
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assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant 
rule.70 
111. ANTECEDENTS AND HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW 
A. Natural Law and Custom 
The origins of the common law can be traced at least from Aristotle7' 
and ~ i c e r o ~ ~  through the Book of It is generally supposed that 
much of the animating basis for early common law derived from an innate, 
elemental, and sometimes theocratic concept of justice often termed "natural 
law."74 
What is "natural law"? Conceding the lack of a single and generally 
agreed to def in i t i~n ,~~ Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr. offered three alterna- 
tive definitions: (I) "rules which are statements of the basic laws of the 
universe, or of man's constitution, or of social and political  relationship^";^^ 
(2) "principles of right, principles which are established or which should be 
established if justice is to prevail";77 and (3) "either a set of standards or 
ideals, [or] a set of limitations imposed upon men by some superhuman 
power."78 
70. Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 
SUP. CT. REV. 429, at 430. 
71. ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V (1947). 
72. Cicero wrote in DE LEGIBUS 11: 
Of all these things about which learned men dispute there is none more important 
than clearly to understand that we are born for justice, and that right is founded 
not upon opinion but in nature. There is indeed a true law, right reason, agieeing 
with nature and diffused among all, unchanging, everlasting, which calls to duty 
by commanding, deters from wrong by forbidding. . . It is not allowed to alter 
this law nor to deviate from it. Nor can it be abrogated. Not can we be released 
from this law either by the senate or by the people. Nor is any person required 
to explain or interpret it. 
BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN I TERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL AW: A STUDY 
IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 5 (1931) [hereinafter WRIGHT, INTERPRETATIONS] 
(quoting CICERO, DE LEGIBUS 11, 4, 10). 
73. See, e.g., James J. Restivo, Jr., Insuring Punitive Damages, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 
1995, at C-1 ("[Iln Exodus 22:9 . . . it is prescribed that one found guilty of taking another's 
property be required to pay back double what was taken."). 
74. WRIGHT, INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 72, at 33-35. See also SURYA PRAKASH 
SINHA, WHAT IS LAW?: THE DIFFERING THEORIES OF JURISPRUDENCE 92-106 (1989). 
75. WRIGHT, INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 72, at 3. 
76. WRIGHT, INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 72, at 3. 
77. WRIGHT, INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 72, at 3. 
78. WRIGHT, INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 72, at 3. 
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For those persons ascribing to a power greater than themselves as the 
giver of natural law, Thomas Aquinas offered this theocratic description: 
[Glranted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, . . . that the 
whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. 
Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler 
of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's 
conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to 
Prov. viii. 23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.79 
With expected succinctness, Richard Posner, in turn, has offered the 
secular observation that equates natural law to "basic political morality."80 
Such rights as were recognized as "natural" to man, and thus cogniza- 
ble to English common law, were not limited by those recognized by Roman 
law or English Royal law. As explained by the thirteenth century British 
jurist, Brackton, a nuisance imposes a servitude upon the land of another. 
It is "an attack upon the ordinary amenities of land-holding, or, in the now 
established if optimistic phrase, upon 'natural rights."'" 
Of course what an age has considered to be a right "natural" to society 
is doubtless affected by custom. Custom too has long been considered a 
building block of the common law.82 In modem common law, the role of 
custom is recognized not as a reference principally to custom of the 
community, as it was in earlier times, but rather to the doctrinal custom of 
hundreds of years of common law, developed by accretion like a coral reef. 
Nevertheless, societal and professional customs still play a recognizable 
role in the development of common law doctrine. For example, the custom 
of an industry may be referred to for determination of whether a brewery 
owner would, in the exercise of ordinary care, place mats upon slippery 
floors, even though such evidence would not preclude a finding of 
negligence if the laissez faire approach, even if generally countenanced, of 
no mats were concluded to be negligent.83 Likewise, such concepts as the 
79. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Suma 77zeologica. Part II, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
29 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938) [hereinafter READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE]. 
80. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 230. 
81. C. H. S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND 
CONTRACT 8 & n. 26 (1970) [hereinafter FIFOOT, HISTORY] (citing HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY 
Of ENGLISH LAW VII 328-33). 
82. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 25-26 (1981). 
83. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J., dictum), cert. 
denied, 287 U.S. 662 ("[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new 
and available devices."); Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and 
Histoiy of Custom in the Law of Torts, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 38 (1992) ("There are many 
competitors for this questionable honor, but Hand's famous bon mot is perhaps the most 
influential, and mischievous, sentence in the history of the law of torts."). 
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prudent man standard for evaluating the conduct of a fiduciary is, of course, 
pregnant with consideration of customary investment and related  practice^.^“ 
B. Early Environmental Torts 
Long before the modem rapture with comprehensive statutory schemes, 
common law courts weighed costs and benefits, and mediated disputes 
between private interest and societal goals. Not surprisingly, much early 
common law rights balancing concerned the reconciliation of competing 
property interests. The societal commitment to a freeholder's liberty to 
develop his land was early limited to development that did not impair the 
rights of neighboring landowners to quietly or profitably enjoy their own 
property. As Bracton wrote: 
If a servitude is imposed upon a man's land by the law, though not by 
the grant of a man, whereby he is forbidden to do on his own land what 
may harm his neighbor, as if he should raise the level of a pond on his 
own land or make a new one whereby his neighbor is harmed, as for 
example if his neighbor's land is thus flooded, this will be an injurious 
nuisance of his neighbor's freehold unless his neighbor has given him 
permission to do it."" 
Solicitude for the rights of the ordinary landholder as against develop- 
ment by more economically powerful neighbors continued into this century. 
In the early New York decision of Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper C O . , ~ ~  the 
court reinstated an injunction against a pulp mill, employing hundreds of 
persons and representing a then substantial $ 1 million investment, that was 
polluting the waters of a downstream neighbor whose actual annual damages 
the jury calculated at $312 per year. Rejecting defendant's claim that the 
injunction should not stand in that plaintiffs alleged actual injury was 
"small as compared with the great loss which will be caused by the issuance 
of the injun~tion."~' the Court of Appeals stated: 
See also Clarence Moms, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1941); 
Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100, 112 (1884) ("If the defendants had proved that 
in every mining establishment that has existed since the days of Tubal-Cain, it has been the 
practice to cut ladder-holes in their platforms, . . . without guarding or lighting them, and 
without notice to contractors or workmen, it would have no tendency to show that the act 
was consistent with ordinary prudence.") 
84. Salem v. Central Trust Co., No. C-930932, 1995 WL 238936, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995). 
85. FIFOOT,' HISTORY, supra note 81, at 8 (citations omitted). 
86. 101 N.E. 805 (1913). 
87. Id. at 805-06. 
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Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the 
defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason 
for refusing an injunction. Neither courts of equity nor law can be 
guided by such a rule, for if followed to its logical conclusion it would 
deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving it to those already 
IV. THE COMMON LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
A. Modem Common Law Goals 
1 .  Social Utility; Wealth Maximization 
From the earliest jurisprudential writings through and including modem 
law and economic theorists, there has existed consensus that a proper goal 
of law, common law and statutory law alike, is the reconciliation of the 
public welfare with private rights. In modem terms, this measurement has 
been termed alternately as one of social utility and wealth rnaximi~ation.~~ 
This inclusive analysis of the role of law measures a law's justice by the 
answer to this question: "Has the law worked the greatest good for the 
greatest number?" 
a. Social Utility 
Essentially, a social utility or utilitarian approach posits that conduct is 
acceptable, if not salutary, if its expected benefits to the actor and to society 
together outweigh its expected hardship upon another in particular or society 
more generally.90 Demonstration of this principle is found in the legal 
disputes following the death of Elvis Presley, involving the issue of whether 
the designees of Presley's estate could control the singer's "right of 
88. Id. at 806. 
89. Although complementary, the two concepts enjoy an important distinction. 
According to Richard A. Posner, the utilitarian analysis may essay to calculate the benefit 
to society of a general good, such as equality of economic opportunity, or preservation of 
green space in urban areas, without reference to the presence or absence of the proponents' 
willingness to pay for such objectives. A "wealth maximization" efficiency approach, on the 
other hand, counts only those "preferences backed by a willingness to pay." Richard A. 
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Eficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 
8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 499 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Ethical and Political Basis]. 
90. Cf: David C .  Owen, The Moral Foundation of Product Liability Law: Toward First 
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993), discussed in Tentative Draft No. 2, supra 
note 23, at 48; David G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice f i r  the 2lst 
Century, l l PACE L. REV. 63 (1990). 
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publicity" as against all others-or, more prosaically, could the estate's 
designees forever profit from others' use of his ~ikeness.~' The Sixth Circuit 
decided to leave undisturbed the traditional common law rule that heirs may 
not retain exclusive control over an ancestor's name or likeness, comment- 
ing in words redolent of economic concerns: 
It does not seem reasonable to expect that [changing the common law 
rule] would enlarge the stock or quality of the goods, services, artistic 
creativity, information, invention or entertainment available. Nor will it 
enhance the fairness of our political and economic system. It seems 
fairer and more efficient for the commercial, aesthetic, and political use 
of the name, memory and image of the famous to be open to all rather 
than to be monopolized by a few.92 
The rest is history. As readily as if they had set up a card table with Elvis 
paraphernalia on Manhattan's Lexington Avenue, the Sixth Circuit anointed 
the modem Elvis industry, an American apotheosis of wealth maximization. 
Such litigation illustrates that a guiding principle of modem economic 
analysis of the law is that the public good is enhanced when the expected 
benefits derived by a rule---benefits to the actor together with benefits to 
society more broadly-utweigh the expected costs, both monetary and 
social. A rule of law achieving this goal is termed "efficient." The 
economic analysis of law to evaluate its efficiency is often called 
"~tilitarian."~~ 
What is meant by social utility, or a utilitarian role of law?94 In a 
general sense, it may be described as law's role in promoting what is just, 
with the implicit expectation that what is just promotes the general welfare. 
Aquinas states the idyllic proposition that "we call those legal matters just, 
which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the 
body politic; since the state is a perfect community[.]"9s James Barr Ames 
expressed the apogee of the utilitarian ethos in these words: "The law is 
utilitarian. It exists for the realization of the reasonable needs of the 
91. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied 449 U.S.  953 (1980). 
92. Id. at 959-60. 
93. See generally James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 110 
(1908); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915). 
94. CJ, John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 
J.  LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978). 
95. READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 79, at 28. See generally DAVID G .  OWEN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (1995). Early "scientific" utilitarian analyses 
"drew upon several trends in Victorian intellectual history for [their] roots." COSGROVE, OUR 
LADY, supra note 5, at 39. 
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community. If the interest of an individual runs counter to this chief object 
of the law, it must be sa~r i f iced."~~ 
Writing that law is "forward looking," a "servant of human needs,"" 
Richard Posner and others call for a scientific ethic of wealth maximization, 
a so-called "efficiency norm."98 Many have responded to this call, with one 
influential commentator concluding that "much (though by no means all) of 
modem tort law is at least roughly consistent with a Posnerian economic 
analysis."99 
Arguing the point, Posner enlists the law of battery---the common law 
rule concerning liability for harmful or offensive touching. Quite apart from 
the corrective justice, moral, and fairness attributes of the doctrine of 
tortious battery, the law and economics argument states that an efficient 
doctrine should "dete[r] persons from engaging in activities that a reasonable 
person would view . . . socially Thus in ~ a r r a t t  v. ~ a i l e ~ , ' ~ '  
remembered as the case in which the nearly six-year-old Dailey pulled away 
the lawn chair as his, until that point, affectionate aunt was sitting down, 
tort liability in battery would serve efficiency principles irrespective of 
whether Dailey received any psychic or material benefit from the act. If 
the harm to the aunt exceeded any benefits to Dailey, a simple utilitarian 
analysis would support imposition of liability. If, on the other hand, Dailey 
derived benefits that exceeded any physical or psychological injury to his 
aunt, pulling out the chair was wasteful or inefficient. Why wasteful? 
Because the transaction (the act and the harm) without the aunt's consent 
would, and did, generate a laborious lawsuit in which great expense, or 
transaction costs, were unnecessarily devoted to determining liability. In 
Posner's words: 
[Tlorts like simple battery . . . involve a . . . coerced transfer of wealth 
to the defendant occurring in a setting of low transaction costs. Such 
conduct is inefficient because it violates the principle . . . that where 
market transaction costs are low, people should be required to use the 
market if they can and to desist from the conduct if they can't. [I]t is 
inefficient to permit the market to be bypassed in this way.'02 
96. Ames, supra note 93, at 110. 
97. POSNER, Problems, supra note 17, at 29. 
98. See, e.g., Posner, Ethical and Political Basis, supra note 89. 
99. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381 (1994). 
100. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS (4th ed. 1994) (discussing 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 191-195 (3d ed. 1986)). 
101. 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955). 
102. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192-193 (2d ed. 1977) 
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. 
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Numerous analysts have identified a common law tropism towards 
efficiency.lo3 Importantly, scholars have also concluded that efficient rules 
of law actually predict efficient litigation strategies, including settlement 
strategies. As stated by Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L. Willbom, 
"[wlhere both parties to a dispute have a continuing interest in precedent, 
the parties will settle if the existing precedent is efficient, but litigate if the 
precedent is ineffi~ient."~~" Wes Parsons, even while disputing these 
premises, collected scholarship revealing, in fact, the broad range of cost 
internalization achievements of evolving common law doctrine.Io5 Included 
in Parsons's review was scholarly attribution to the common law of 
accidents as promoting "efficient resource al lo~ation;" '~~ the efficiencies of 
the common law of rescue, salvage, and Good Samaritan assi~tance;'~' the 
efficiency of the common law damages rule for anticipatory repudiation of 
a c~ntract; '~'  and the efficiency of the economic loss rule in tort. Io9 
A primitive but greatly persuasive, evaluative standard was offered in 
a negligence context by Judge Learned Hand in the opinions in United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co."O and Conway v. OJBrien."' In those two 
cases, the court stated that "the degree of care appropriate to a situation is 
the result of the calculus using three factors: the likelihood that the conduct 
will injure others, multiplied by the seriousness of the risk if it happens, 
balanced against the burden of taking precautions against the risk." In 
formula, the calculation is known to many as B (Burden) < P (Probability 
of Harm) x L (Magnitude of Loss Should It O c c ~ r ) . " ~  The Learned Hand 
103. E.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J .  LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, The 
Efficiency of the Common Law Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON. U. L. REV. 157 (1991). 
104. Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 103, at 157. 
105. Wes Parsons, Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983). 
106. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort 
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 852 (1981). 
107. William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and 
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 128 (1977). 
108. Thomas H. Jackson, 'Anticipatory Repudiation' and the Temporal Element of 
Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective 
Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, (1978) ("Compensating the aggrieved party for its 
entire expectation loss, without overcompensating it, is an economically sound principle in 
that it facilitates the movement of goods and services to their higher value user.") 
109. W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1982). 
1 10. 159 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
111. 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd 312 U.S. 492 (1941). 
112. Of Hand's formula, Posner writes: 
This is an economic test. The burden of precautions is the cost of avoiding the 
accident. The loss multiplied by the probability of the accident is the expected 
accident cost, i.e., the cost that the precautions would have averted. If a larger 
cost could have been avoided by incuning a smaller cost, efficiency requires that 
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approach can be conformed to more modern utilitarian analysis by 
visualizing B, or the Burden upon the actor, as encompassing not only the 
particular burden of precautionary measures upon the actor, but also the 
burden upon society if the conduct must either be eliminated due to liability 
rules, or made more expensive, and therefore beyond the economic reach of 
many, and then asking would the precautionary measures be undertaken.'13 
A leading exponent of the efficiency role of the common law of tort 
was Professor, now Judge, Guido Calabresi, who argued persuasively that 
in matters of compensation for accidents, civil liability should ordinarily be 
laid at the door of the "cheapest cost avoider," the actor who could most 
easily discover and inexpensively remediate the hazard. Together with A. 
Douglas Melamed, Calebresi states persuasively that, particularly in the 
setting of environmental harm, considerations of economic efficiency dictate 
placing the cost of accidents "on the party or activity which can most 
cheaply avoid them."'14 Validation of this approach came in the Ninth 
Circuit decision in Union Oil Co. v. Oppe~z,"~ a California coastal oil spill 
case in which the court allowed commercial fishermen to recover their 
business losses caused by lost fishing opportunity during a period of 
pollution. The court followed Calabresi's suggestion that it "exclude as 
potential cost-avoiders those groups\acf vities which could avoid accident 
costs only at extremely high expense,"lI6 a consideration militating against 
the conclusion that the cost of preventing or repositioning the loss be borne 
directly by consumers (fishermen or seafood purchasers) in the form of 
precautionary measures (whatever they might hypothetically be), or by first 
party insurance. Rather, the court found justice and efficiency were served 
by placing responsibility for the loss on the "best cost avoider," in this 
setting the defendant oil company, reasoning: 
[Tlhe loss should be allocated to that party who can best correct any 
error in allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the activity to which the 
the smaller cost be incurred. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 122 (citations omitted). 
113. Likewise in keeping with a utilitarian view that transcends the concerns of the 
individual plaintiff and defendant, consideration of the factors P (Probability of Harm) and 
L (Magnitude of the Loss should it occur) would be enlarged to contemplate the likelihood 
of harm to others, and the magnitude of the potential harm, not only in terms of the 
individual plaintiff but also to the population exposed to the risk. 
114. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View at the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972). See 
also MARK C. RUDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY AND TORT 
REFORM 29, 32-33 (1995). 
115. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
1 16. Id. at 569. 
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party has been made liable. The capacity "to buy out" the plaintiffs if 
the burden is too great is, in essence, the real focus of Calabresi's 
approach. On this basis, there is no contest--the defendants' capacity is 
superior.' I' 
A utilitarian analysis also influences modem rules governing issuance 
of injunctions, but here the accepted standards have in effect forced a 
mamage of utilitarian principles with those of corrective justice. Again in 
the setting of environmental harm, notions of corrective justice and 
utilitarianism have coexisted uneasily for decades. Put most simply, courts 
then and today must wrestle with choices between (1) corrective justice 
(putting remediation of plaintiffs wrongfully-caused harm as the most 
prominent objective); or (2) utilitarian justice, pursuant to which the court 
may permit defendant to continue all or part of the injurious conduct, most 
often accompanied by a requirement that plaintiffs be indemnified for their 
involuntary hardship. 
Originally, and due in some measure to the sanctity in which the 
common law of property held interests in land, even the most economically 
powerless landholder could seek and secure an injunction against a neigh- 
boring activity that interfered substantially with the plaintiff s use of his 
property. Against a defendant's argument that its smelter, or its pulp mill, 
employed hundreds of people and brought great wealth to the community, 
in deciding whether or not to issue an injunction an early court responded 
that it was unwilling to "balance" injuries. The court would not weigh the 
defendant's cost and the community hardship in losing the industry, against 
the often modest provable harm to plaintiffs ordinarily small and noncom- 
mercial property. As the New York Court of Appeals stated in W h ~ l e n , " ~  
to fail to grant the small landowner an injunction solely because the loss to 
him, in absolute terms, is less than would be the investment-backed loss to 
the nuisance-creating business and lost employment of the community, 
would "deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving it to those 
already r i ~ h . " " ~  By "giving it," the court of course means "requiring 
plaintiff to endure ongoing environmental servitudes imposed by 
defendant."'*' 
- - 
117. Id. at 570 (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970)). 
118. 101 N.E. 805 (1913). 
119. Id. at 806. 
120. Id. See also McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951 (D. Utah 
1904) (reaching a comparable corrective justice conclusion, and granting the injunction 
against defendant's mine and smelter). 
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Wh~len,'~' together with Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur Copper & Iron 
C O . , ' ~ ~  in a mirror image judicial response, pose the dilemma presented by 
a plaintiffs environmental claim against the conduct of an entity enjoying 
economic influence in the community. Contrasted with the Whalen court's 
unabashedly populist sentiment, the modern rule of environmental injunc- 
tions might seem coldly utilitarian. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 936 factors for injunction issuance expressly include weighing of 
"the nature of the interest to be pr~tected," '~~ thus, presumably inviting an 
elevation of plaintiffs bona fides where the court considers the activity 
meritorious, perhaps a Camp Fire Girls campground, and a devaluation 
where the court deems it less valuable, perhaps an automobile scrapyard. 
Along similar lines, hardship to the defendant of ceasing or changing its 
activity and "the interests of third persons or the public" are proper 
 consideration^.'^^ To this observer, Mr. Whalen would have difficulty today 
in obtaining his injunction. 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.lZS involved a widescale and conceded 
industrial nuisance in the form of airborne cement dust emanating from an 
upstate New York cement plant. In the lower court, a nuisance was found, 
and temporary damages awarded, but plaintiffs' application for an injunction 
was denied. Before the New York Court of Appeals, Judge Bergen's 
opinion early identified the policy issue most troublesome to the court: to 
what extent should the court in deciding a justiciable controversy between 
private litigants simultaneously decide broad'policy issues (in this case air 
quality) often thought the proper province of legis la t i~n? '~~ 
Recognizing that to deny the injunction would depart from Whalen's 
corrective justice--no balancing approach, discussed above, the court 
nevertheless adopted a utilitarian approach that weighed the hardships 
121. 101 N.E. 805 (1913). 
122. 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904). Ducktown Sulphur involved a state supreme court's 
reversal of a trial court's injunction, where the high court assigned great weight to 
defendant's showing that an injunction would render useless defendant's property, valued at 
many multiples the value of plaintiffs property and representing the largest single 
contribution to county revenues, as well as turn out of work hundreds of employees. The 
court observed that it is often true "in a case of conflicting rights, . . . that neither party can 
enjoy his own without in some measure restricting the liberty of the other." Id. at 667. 
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 936 (a) (1979). 
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 936 (e), (f), (g) (1979). 
125. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
126. Id. Even without resolution of the question of whether or when it is appropriate to 
exercise "judicial power to use a decision in private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to 
achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court," 
Judge Bergen observed that the resolution of air quality issues "is likely to require massive 
public expenditure and to demand more than any local community can accomplish and to 
depend on regional and interstate controls." Id. at 871. 
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imposed upon plaintiffs against the economic consequences, for Atlantic 
Cement and for regional employment, of the requested injunction: 
The ground for denial of injunction, notwithstanding the finding both that 
there is a nuisance and that plaintiffs have been damaged substantially, 
is the large disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and of 
the injunction."' 
2 .  Corrective Justice 
The moral authority of natural law, and its successor the common law, 
turns upon the perception and the reality that its tenets lead to "just" 
results.'28 What is meant by "justice?" In Aquinas's words, "a thing is said 
to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason."'29 Most 
contemporary observers would agree that a core consideration in any modem 
contemplation of "justice" is the goal of "corrective" justice, i.e., a result 
that, to the extent money damages can, deprives the wrongful party of their 
gain, and restores the injured party to the position they enjoyed before the 
harm.'30 Holmes, contemplating torts, explained: 
Be the exceptions more or less numerous, the general purpose of the law 
of torts is  t o  secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm to 
127. Id. at 872. Authentic questions may be raised about the reach of Boomer. It is 
possible that Boomer is an anomaly in that Atlantic Cement was a big economic contributor 
to the region and, for the purposes of the suit, the conduct of its business operations was 
Simon pure. Cf: Little Joseph Realty v. Town of Babylon, 363 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (N.Y. 
1977), in which the same New York Court of Appeals issued an injunction against an asphalt 
plant operating contrary to zoning ordinances, and distinguished Boomer as a case involving 
"no zoning violation, or for that matter, [no] violation of any other statute." 
128. As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb i . 9 ,  "[tlhat which is not just seems to be no law 
at all: wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human 
affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the 
first rule of reason is the law of nature. . . . Consequently, every human law has just so much 
of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects 
from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law." READINGS I N  
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 79, at 37. Cj, Randy E. Bamett, Getting Nonnative: The Role 
of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMM. 93, 105-1 13 (1995). 
129. READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 79, at 37. 
130. 1 say "to the extent possible" because the majority of common law remedies involve 
the award of money damages, and money damages do not restore to their pre-incident 
condition a person who has suffered personal physical injury, or the dignitary injury of a 
defamation or an invasion of privacy. Likewise it is only by flight of the-imagination that 
we suppose the payment of money damages deprives a defendant of a "gain" achieved by 
a tortious battery or medical malpractice. In these settings, the justification of common law 
remedies will depend heavily upon connections with other goals, such as deterrence, 
individual autonomy and liberty, and instrumentalism. 
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person, reputation, or estate, at the hands of his neighbors, not because 
they are wrong, but because they are harms."' 
In Book Five, chapter two of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is credited 
with laying the cornerstone of the corrective justice principles of the 
common law.I3* Under the Aristotelian corrective principle of diorthotikos, 
or "making straight," at the remedy phase the court will attempt "to equalize 
things by means of the penalty, taking away the gain from the assailant. For 
the term 'gain' is applied generally to such cases, even if it be not a term 
appropriate to certain cases, e.g., to the person who inflicts a wound-and 
'loss' to the sufferer. . . . The judge restores equality."'33 
3. Instrumentalism and Morality 
a. Instrumentalism 
The instrumental role of common law doctrines comprises its effect 
upon social and business behavior. A rule having a successful instrumental 
role will convey simultaneously an exhortative, hortatory message, lauding 
behavior deemed beneficial, together with a message intended to discourage 
or deter behavior deemed bad by whatever measure (utilitarian or rights- 
based). As an abstract proposition, a just and effective common law rule 
will encourage positive and productive behavior and discourage negative 
activity. 
Often the instrumental objectives of a rule may not be apparent on its 
face, and are evident only upon their salutary realization in risk reduction, 
131. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 35, at 144. 
132. Considered synonymous with the terms "rectificatory" or "commutative." POSNER, 
PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 313. "[Tlhe law . . . treats the parties as equal, and asks only 
if one is the author and the other the victim of injustice or if the one inflicted and the other 
has sustained an injury. Injustice in this sense is unfair or unequal, and the endeavor of the 
judge is to equalize it." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 146 (J. Welldon trans., 1912), 
discussed in DAVID G.  OWEN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FAULT IN TORT LAW 
(1995). 
133. 2 ARISTOTLE, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1786-87 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 
1984). "It is for this reason," Aristotle continues, "that it is called just [dikaion], because it 
is a division into two parts [dika] . . . and the judge [dikastes] is one who bisects [dichastes] 
. . . . Therefore the just . . . consists in having an equal amount before or after the 
transaction." Id. 
See generally Richard W. Wright, SubstantiveCorrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625 
(1 992). 
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loss prevention or the like.'34 The empirical failure of a common law 
doctrine may likewise manifest itself. 
i. Discouragement of Harmful Conduct 
Imposition of an external standard of conduct, it has been argued, 
serves less to buy, affect or co-opt the moral position of the population than 
to put persons on notice of the behavior expected of them to avoid liability. 
In Holmes' words: 
The true explanation of the reference of liability to a moral 
standard . . . . is not that it is for the purpose of improving men's 
hearts, but that it is to give a man a fair chance to avoid the harm before 
he is held responsible for it. It is intended to reconcile the policy of 
letting accidents lie where they fall, and the reasonable freedom of others 
with the protection of the individual from injury.'35 
Just what is Holmes' "fair chance to avoid" behavior before being held 
responsible for it? In tort, for example, the triggering event for imposition 
of responsibility for another's loss takes "knowledge" as the "starting point," 
followed by examination of the cccircumstances" that "would have led a 
prudent man to perceive danger, although not necessarily to foresee the 
specific harm."'36 What are such circumstances? Holmes answers 
"experien~e.'''~' 
The goal of deterrence has seemingly been torts' perpetual and faithhl 
companion. As early as 1890 an academic author wrote of the goals of the 
negligence action in these words: 
The really important matter is to adjust the dispute between the parties 
by a rule of conduct which shall do justice if possible in the particular 
case, but which shall also be suitable to the needs of the community, and 
tend to prevent like accidents from happening in [the] future.13* 
- -- 
134. The instrumentalism of law was recognized by Aquinas: "A thing may be known 
in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is 
found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays." 
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 79, at 3 1. 
135. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 35, at 144. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. William Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theoy of Contributoty Negligence, 3 HARV. 
L. REV. 263, 269 (1890). 
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Even those who question whether tort law, for example, "does in fact deter 
as thoroughly as economic models suggest"13g concede it delivers a 
"moderate amount of detert'en~e.'''~~ 
ii. Encouragement of Useful Conduct 
The instrumental quality of law, be it positive (statutory) law or 
common law, lies in its capacity to influence behavior. Thus, by hypothesis 
( I )  following the notorious verdict involving the woman scalded by 
McDonald's coffee, it might be predicted that fast food restaurants would 
serve coffee at lower temperatures; (2) following the English decision in 
Lumley v. Gye,14' a rival theater owner might be disinclined to importune a 
leading singer away from her existing contractual obligations; and (3) after 
the verdict arising from the spill of the Exxon Valdez, tanker owners might 
be more probing in their evaluation of the fitness of vessel captains. 
b. The Moral Promontory: Mores and Morality 
Ronald Dworkin has been called a "chief evangelist" of the proposition 
that judges should advance a right-based jurisprudence rooted in moral 
precepts,I4* a proposition that begs the question: "To whose moral precepts 
do we refer?" In periods of our country's past in which populations were 
less heterogenous and political power less pluralistic, the guiding precepts 
were those of white Christian males. Many academic analyses have 
concluded that nineteenth century judges unabashedly used tort law as a 
device for inducing morally suitable b e h a ~ i 0 r . l ~ ~  
Does morality remain an identifiable fixture of modem common law 
doctrine? Emest J. Weinrib answers affirmatively, pointing to tort doctrine 
as common law in which wrongdoing is a necessary, if not by itself 
sufficient, component of liability.'44 How is a moral position to be 
determined? Rawls claimed that "one of the aims of moral philosophy is to 
139. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 379. 
140. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 379. 
141. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). 
142. Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a Theory 
of Contract, 41 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 925, 925 n.l (1987) (citing RONALD WORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS ERIOUSLY 1-130 (1977)). 
143. E.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common Law Background of Nineteenth Century 
Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1128 (1990). 
144. Emest J. Weinrib, The Morality of Tort Law, Address at the Tort Law Section, 
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 9, 1988), discussed in Kotler, 
supra note 59, at 123 1 n.2, 1240. 
-. 
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look for possible bases of agreement where none seem to exist; [Moral 
philosophy] must attempt to extend the range of existing con~ensus." '~~ 
To some, the modem surge towards strict tort liability, even though 
receding in some settings, is reflective of a moralistic conception of 
indemnity obligations, i.e., behavioral and compensatory obligations 
unaffected by utilitarian weighing or even, when taken to the extreme, 
comparative causal contribution. Richard Posner explained the shift (until 
quite recently at least) from negligence based criteria for accident compensa- 
tion to strict liability in these words: "The need for compensation is 
unaffected by whether the participants in the accident were careless or 
careful[,] and we have outgrown a morality that would condition the right 
to compensation upon a showing that the plaintiff was blameless and the 
defendant blame~orthy." '~~ 
4.  Individual Autonomy and Liberty 
What do we mean by the terms autonomy and liberty? "Autonomy" 
has been defined as "independence or freed~m."'~' Liberty, in turn, is 
defined as "[flreedom from external control of interference, obligations, etc., 
freedom to choose."'48 Some have argued that among the first tasks of a 
common law doctrine such as torts "is to define the boundaries of individual 
liberty."'49 The "justice" rationale of private property, in turn, "is [that it] 
enhances [the owner's] reasonable au ton~my." '~~  
145. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 582 (1971). As Holmes explained, describing 
the common law antecedents of the modem law of misrepresentation: 
[tlhe common law . . . preserves the reference to morality by making fraud the 
ground on which it goes. It does not hold that a man always speaks at his peril. 
But starting from the moral ground, it works out an external standard of what 
would be fraudulent in the average prudent member of the community, and 
requires every member at his peril to avoid that. 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 35, at 137. 
Holmes likewise identified a moral basis for the common law action in malicious 
prosecution. "The legal remedy here, again, started from the moral basis, the occasion for 
it, no doubt, being similar to that which gave rise to the old law of conspiracy, that a man's 
enemies would sometime seek his destruction by setting criminal law in motion against him." 
HOLMES, T H E  COMMON LAW, supra note 35, at 141. 
146. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29-30 (1972). 
147. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 92 (rev. ed. 1975). 
148. Id. at 772. 
149. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J .  LEGAL STUD. 151, 203 (1973). 
150. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 173 (1 980), discussed in David 
G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the Twenty-first Century, 11 PACE L. 
REV. 63, 65 & n.4 (1990). 
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In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz writes that "[a]utonomy 
requires that many morally acceptable options be available to a per~on."'~' 
Our society's commitment to a legal system vouching safe individual 
autonomy and liberty is expressed in the earliest interpretations of its 
organizing principles in the Constitution. In his dissent in the Slaughter- 
House ~ a s e s , ' ~ ~  Mr. Justice Field described the import of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses of Article IV, Section 2 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as ensuring that "which of right belong[s] to the citizens of all 
free governments. Clearly, among these must be placed the right to pursue 
lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as 
equally affects all persons."'53 As our society recognizes a fundamental 
right to pursue lawful activity without wrongful interference of others, it 
likewise has recognized the right to do so with relative safety from personal 
physical harm. Another's autonomy or liberty interest extends, as it were, 
to the tip of your nose and no further. As Professor Richard Epstein has 
explained: "[Tlhe law of tort does not end with the recognition of 
individual liberty. Once a man causes harm to another, he has brought 
himself within the boundaries of the law of tort."'54 
Economists, in turn, might cast the sentiments of individual autonomy 
and liberty in terms of avoiding involuntary or coerced transfers of wealth. 
A manufacturer of amplified sound systems who loses customers as a result 
of a trade libelfi5 or a theater owner whose premier singer under contract is 
lured away by a rival theater,'56 each suffers lost profits. The rival theater 
owner may actually realize a money profit from the wrongful interference 
with the singer's contractual obligations. The author of the trade libel may 
gain increased sales of his or her business commentary, or may merely 
realize a nonpecuniary increase in wealth-whatever satisfaction one might 
derive from having harshly and erroneously criticized a large corporation. 
The economist argues that the theater's suit for interference with contractual 
relations, or the manufacturer's suit for trade libel, operate simply to correct 
a coerced transfer of wealth. If those lost profits are left unrnediated by a 
15 1 .  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 378 (1986). 
152. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
153. Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting). 
154. Epstein, supra note 149, at 208. Professor Epstein continues: "It does not follow, 
however, that he will be found liable in each and every case in which it can be showed that 
he caused harm, for it may still be possible for him to escape liability, not by an insistence 
upon his freedom of action, but upon a specific showing that his conduct was either excused 
or justified." Epstein, supra note 149, at 208. 
155. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 485 (1984). 
156. Lumley v. Gye, 1 18 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). 
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remedy for money damages, they represent an involuntary and inefficient 
transfer of wealth from the injured party to the injurer. 
C. The Process of Enlightened Gradualism 
Let us now turn to a broader consideration of the systems, mechanisms 
and means by which the common law effects its goals of justice and 
efficiency. By trial, error, experiment, expansion, and correction, the 
common law has hewn to an objective of advancing the public welfare. 
Making obeisance in turn to principles of corrective justice, individual 
autonomy, instrumentalism and efficiency, courts hearing common law 
claims receive and resolve disputes that ordinarily are not the subject of 
statute or regulation. Reconciling the nominally divergent goals of 
corrective justice and efficiency--the incongruity between which is more 
formal than real1"-+he common law proceeds along a course of enlightened 
gradualism. I use the term enlightened to describe common law judges' 
identification and consideration of evolving societal needs, examined 
through the lens of developed principles of modem justice, sociology and 
economics. The term gradualism connotes recognition of the common law 
court's constant reference in existing doctrine and precedent, providing it 
with a genuine but moderated capacity to mold new doctrine. 
What have been the principal methodologies of the common law 
capacity for growth? This section discusses but a few. 
1. Conditional Stare Decisis 
An original assessment of a court's obligation to follow germane prior 
decisions, or precedent, of its own or superior courts, commonly called the 
rule of stare decisis, left some common law judges with the perception that 
theirs was a limited charge of the application of precedent to new 
di~putes.''~ As early as 1833, English Jurist Baron Parke stated the theory 
of case law in these words: "It appears to me to be of great importance to 
keep this principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the 
157. LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at 9. "[Iln the absence 
of a more precise specification of fairness we find no necessary incompatibility between a 
positive theory [of torts] that stresses fairness and one that stresses efficiency." LANDES & 
POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 18, at 19. 
158. In 1890 one author described a modest court prerogative: "The office of the judge 
is not to make [the law] . . . but to find it, and, when it is found, to affix to it his official 
mark, by which it becomes more certainly known and authenticated." JAMES C. CARTER, THE 
IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL IN THE LAW 23 1, quoted in COSGROVE, OUR LADY, supra note 5, 
at 32. 
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determination of the particular case, but for the interests of law as a 
science."'59 
Unlike legislatures, which may shed prior policies as a snake sheds its 
skin, courts applying common law principles are at least nominally 
constrained by stare decisis.I6O Professor Eisenberg, in The Nature of the 
Common Law, offers this modem description of the doctrine and its 
contemporary role, emphasizing support and replicability as its central 
tenets: 
Under [the principle of stare decisis,] as it is traditionally formulated, the 
'ratio decidiendi' (ground of decision), 'holding,' or 'rule' of a precedent 
is binding in subsequent cases, within broad limits. . . . Under the 
principles of support and replicability, the courts must establish and 
apply rules that are supported by the general standards of 
society, . . . and must adopt a process of reasoning that is replicable by 
the profession. Reasoning from precedent satisfies both those 
 principle^.'^' 
For Professor Eisenberg's distillation of stare decisis into the twin goals of 
support and replicability, stare decisis has always represented more of an 
aspirational goal than a rule of any rigidity. Perhaps the bloom of stare 
decisis was off the rose when Lord Gardner, Lord Chancellor of England, 
was reported in the New York Times as announcing the Law Lords' 
abandonment of a rule observed for six decades that the body was powerless 
to alter its own decisions. Henceforth, Lord Gardner stated, the Law Lords 
would be free to "depart from a previous decision when it appears right to 
do so."'62 
159. ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 231 (1966) [hereinafter HOGUE, 
ORIGINS] (quoting Morehouse v. Rennell, I C1 & F., 527, 546). 
160. See RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 103 (3d ed. 1977); ABNER J. 
MIKVA, THE SHIFTING SANDS OF LEGAL TOPOGRAPHY (reviewing CALABRESI, AGE OF 
STATUTES, supra note 4). See also HOGUE, ORIGINS, supra note 159, at 23 1: 
Our Common Law system consists in the applying to new combinations of 
circumstance those rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial 
precedents; and for the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency, and certainty, 
we must apply those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable and 
inconvenient, to all cases which arise; and we are not at liberty to reject them, 
and to abandon all analogy to them, in those to which they have not yet been 
judicially applied, because we think that the rules are not as convenient and 
reasonable as we ourselves could have devised. 
HOGUE, ORIGINS, supra note 159, at 23 1 (quoting Morehouse). 
161. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 47 (1988) [hereinafter 
EISENBERG, NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW] (emphasis added). 
162. N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1966, 4 E. at 6, quoted in White & White v. King, 223 A.2d 
763, 766 n. 1 (Md. App. 1966). 
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Our own courts have repeatedly confirmed that stare decisis imposes 
no more than a rebuttable obligation, which obligation is released when 
competing public policy beckons persuasively. In one court's words, 
[nlotwithstanding the great importance of the doctrine of stare decisis, we 
have never construed it t o  inhibit us  from changing or  modifying a 
common law rule by judicial decision where we find, in light o f  changed 
conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has become unsound in 
the circumstances of modem life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable 
to our people.'63 
And as a Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated: "[tlhis Court has 
manifested a willingness to change common law rules which have 'become 
unsound in the circumstances of modern life. 9 , 9 1 6 4  Thus the animating 
principle for abandoning an established rule of common law is that where 
the reasons for a rule have changed, the law too should change.'65 
Whether or not a given common law rule will be scrutinized for 
modification or rejection is a function of the whether the court considers the 
rule just. The enduring "justice" of a given common law rule is revealed 
163. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 526 (Md. 1983) (abandoning spousal immunity 
bar as applied to a vehicular tort claim brought by a woman against her estranged husband). 
164. Jones v. Maryland, 486 A.2d 184, 188 (Md. 1985) (abrogating common law rule 
precluding conviction of an accessory before the fact of a higher crime than that for which 
the principal has been convicted). The court in Jones noted further that another common law 
rule discarded once it became "obsolete" was that of precluding trial of an accessory until 
the principal was tried. Id. at 188 (citations omitted). 
165. New Jersey v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715, 724 (N.J. 1957) ("As long ago as 1609, in 
Milborn's Case, 7 Coke 7a (K.B. 1609), Lord Coke stated that the reason for the law is the 
soul of the law, and if the reason for the law has changed, the law is changed.") Along 
similar lines, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote "[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule 
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED PAPERS 187 
(1920). 
CJ, White, 223 A.2d 763 (involving an automobile guest statute and a choice of law 
issue). While declining appellant's request that the court abandon Maryland's lex loci delicti 
rule the court nevertheless states: 
The doctrine of stare decisis, important as it is, is not to be construed as 
preventing us from changing a rule of law if we are convinced that the rule has 
become unsound in the circumstances of modem life. While it is important, in 
our legal system, that persons should know the probable consequences of their 
acts, that consideration has little bearing on the commission of unintentional 
torts. . . . It is characteristic of our legal system that the emergence of a new 
doctrine depends for its clarification on the case-to-case decisions, as its 
application to different factual situations presents new difficulties to be resolved 
and new factors to be weighed. .:. 
White, 223 A.2d at 766. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  1 8  UALR L. J. 590 1995-1996 
19961 THE VITAL COMMON LAW 59 1 
in the degree of acceptance accorded it in ensuing decisions, for it will be 
the decisions that follow which reveal the community's adoption or rejection 
of the rule. Cardozo identified the paradox that it is the very reality that a 
judge's expansion or contraction of existing doctrine may be rejected on 
appeal or in later decisions should liberate the court to apply its independent 
reasoning to the case before it. In Cardozo's words: "I sometimes think 
that we wony ourselves overmuch about the enduring consequences of our 
errors. . . . In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant 
rejection of the dross."'66 
- 
Have courts succumbed to the heady recognition that they can depart 
from established precedent seemingly at will? The decisions suggest that 
they have not. For example, courts have rejected invitations to decree new 
public policy judicially, particularly where a new policy would fly in the 
face of manifest legislative intent. In one Maryland decision, Felder v. 
  elder,'^' a drunk driving case, the court was asked to countenance a claim 
against a tavern owner who sold liquor to a visibly intoxicated person. who 
was later involved in an accident. Rejecting the invitation, it concluded: 
"[Wle should virtually usurp legislative power if we should declare 
plaintiffs contentions to be the law of Maryland. . . . On few subjects are 
legislators kept better informed of legislation in other states."'68 
Does such a malleable interpretaticn of stare decisis doctrine throw the 
common law and broader jurisprudential goal of predictability, or Professor 
Eisenberg's support and replicability, into a cocked hat? Are the interests 
of those engaged in or contemplating business or private pursuits disserved 
for being denied a clear common law expression of what conduct is 
permitted and what is penalized? Are common law rules truly formed as a 
man might make rules for his dog, by waiting for an excess or an omission 
and then punishing defendant for it? 
To the argument that the very qualities of flexibility we have ascribed 
to the common law work unfairly against the actor who may not know in 
advance he may be liable in reparations for his conduct, Cardozo responds 
that "even when there is ignorance of the rule, the cases are few in which 
ignorance has determined conduct."'69 Other courts and commentators have 
parsed it according to whether potentially affected activity is a private one, 
or one that is commercial or public. Common law judges are more reluctant 
to give greater amplitude to an existing law affecting business matters, in 
reliance upon which investment-based decisions have been made, than upon 
166. CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 47, at 179. 
167. 438 A.2d 494 (Md. App. 1981). 
168. Id. at 496 (quoting State v. Hatfield, 78 A.2d 754 (Md. Ct. App. 1951)). 
169. CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 47, at 145. 
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common law rules affecting personal conduct. Developing this distinction, 
the court in Woods v. ~ a n c e t ' ~ ~  stated: 
[Rlules of law on which men rely in their business dealings should not 
be changed in the middle-of the game, but what has that to do with 
bringing to justice a tort-feasor who surely has no moral or other right 
to rely on a decision of the New York Court of Appeals? Negligence law 
is common law, and the common law has been molded and changed and 
brought up to date in many another case. Our court [has] . . . not only 
the right, but the duty to reexamine a question where justice demands 
it."' 
2. Flexibility and Particularized Determination 
One of the most distinctive qualities of common law adjudication is its 
path of deductive reasoning, i.e., the following or forging of a path from 
general principles to a conclusion specific to the case before it.I7* In the 
most liberal sense, the process is scientific. As Cornelius J. Peck explains: 
'"[Flrequent encounters with a general problem, presented in various 
contexts that an endless variety of fact patterns provides, give courts a type 
of experimental program in which they can formulate and test a governing 
ru1e.),?173 
Where precedent is seemingly sound and the facts presented by a 
particular case are neither novel nor noteworthy, the process followed by the 
common law judge is similar in ways to that followed by a- judge applying 
a statute.'74 True, however, to its distinctive role as the forum for resolving 
conflicts as to which there is not yet consensus, or at least a brokered 
legislative solution, it is the common law jury to which litigants repair for 
170. 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951). 
171. Id. at 694. 
172. "Deduction" is defined as "the act or practice of deducing; reasoning from a known 
principle to an unknown; from the general to the specific, or from a premise to a 
conclusion." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 383 
(College Ed. 1962). 
173. Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 
48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 297 (1963), discussed in Carl T .  Bogus, War on the Common Law: 
The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 65 (1995). 
174. "[Ulnless [exceptional] conditions are present, the work of deciding cases in 
accordance with precedents that plainly fit them is a process similar in its nature to that of 
deciding cases in accordance with a statute. It is a process of search, comparison, and little 
more[,]" a mechanistic endeavor comparable to "match[ing] the colors of the case at hand 
against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon their desk." CARDOZO, JUDICIAL 
PROCESS, supra note 47, at 20. 
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answers to "complicated and doubtful cases[.]"'75 Using the model of 
products liability, Professor Marshall Shapo has ably described the fact- 
sensitive and particularized evaluation that characterizes the incremental 
development of design defect, informational obligation and other dimensions 
of the common law of products liability: 
Products liability is highly fact oriented, a phenomenon manifest in the 
case law on defect, issues of liability as they pertain to the position of 
parties in the distributional chain, the problems involving alleged failure 
to warn, and in questions of proof. In part because of this orientation, 
and also in this way reflecting the general law of torts, products law 
requires incremental development. It is a classic of case-by-case 
construction of lines of precedents, which courts constantly test against 
their own jurisprudence on the subject and indeed against the bodies of 
law developing in other states. It is the very model of the cross-country 
conversation about the law that is a salutary feature of American 
j~risprudence."~ 
3. Adaptive Ability 
To Arthur R. Hogue, "[tlhe survival of the [English] common law has 
depended in large part on the ability of its practitioners to adapt the legal 
system to new c o n d i t i o n ~ n d  adaptation has meant growth. Bold judges 
have created precedents adding new rules to meet new social and economic 
circum~tances."'~~ Has the American experience been similar? The 
Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc. 17* is 
emblematic. 
a. Kelley v. R. G. Industries 
A microcosm of the qualities, and the liabilities, of common law 
growth is Kelley, which involved the painful and modem problem of injury 
and death caused by criminal use of small, concealable handguns, often 
" 
called "Saturday-Night Specials." In this suit, a convenience store employee 
who was wounded in a Maryland holdup sued the West German manufac- 
turer of the Rohrn revolver. The complaint alleged that the manufacture and 
distribution of the gun was an abnormally dangerous activity, and that the 
~ ~- 
175. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 35, at 160. 
176. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liabilip: The ALI Restatement 
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995). 
177. HOGUE, ORIGINS, supra note 159, at 233. 
178. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. App. 1985). 
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gun itself was defective within the meaning of products liability law because 
of its negligent or incautious "marketing, promotion, distribution and 
de~ign.'"'~ 
The Maryland Court of Appeals found itself obligated to reject these 
two counts. The handgun could not be considered "abnormally dangerous" 
under the rule in Restatement (Second) of Torts $5  519-520 because 
Maryland courts, in line with courts of other jurisdictions, had not extended 
the doctrine beyond its original precincts, i.k., imposition of liability only 
upon owners or occupiers of land.Is0 Neither could the gun be considered 
defective inasmuch as it functioned precisely as it had been designed to 
perform, and as the user had expected it to perform. 
In terms of conventional dialectic, the thesis accepted by the Maryland 
court was that the sale of so-called Saturday Night Specials posed a grave 
and nonreciprocal danger to urban safety, and must therefore be deterred. 
The antithesis comprised two prongs: (1) extant products liability law posed 
obstacles to finding such handguns "defective" where they did, in fact, 
perform as was expected; and (2) existing law governing liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities had not been extended to encompass 
products that were, at the time of injury, no longer in the actual or 
constructive control of the manufacturer. 
What avenues, then, were open to the Kelley court? It could not 
declare "all handguns or handgun usage . . . inconsistent with Maryland 
public policy" as that would be at a clear variance with the state's 
"comprehensive regulatory scheme concerning the wearing, carrying and 
transporting of handguns.'"'' No such obstacle existed, however, to the 
declaration of liability for certain gunshot injuries caused by a small subset 
of firearms used in the course of criminal conduct. In the court's words: 
There is, however, a limited category of handguns which clearly is not 
sanctioned as a matter of public policy. To impose strict liability upon 
the manufacturers and marketers of .these handguns, in instances of 
gunshot wounds caused by criminal use, would not be contrary to the 
policy embodied in the enactments of the General Assembly. This type 
of handgun, commonly known as a 'Saturday Night Special,' presents 
particular problems for law enforcement.la2 
179. Id. at 1145. 
180. Id. at 1147. 
18 1 .  Id. at 1 1  51, 1153 (discussing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, $ 36B-36G (Cum. Supp. 
1984)). 
1 8 2 .  Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1153. The court continued with a definition of "Saturday Night 
Specials" as "characterized by short barrels, light weight, easy concealability, low cost, use 
of  cheap quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and unreliability. These character- 
istics render the Saturday Night Special particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually 
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The Kelley crafting of common law liability for manufacturers of 
inexpensive, concealable handguns was soon overturned by the Maryland 
legi~lature. '~~ Yet the seed planted will doubtless continue to sprout else- 
where until a lasting common law response to this form of urban violence 
is achieved. Has the Kelley experience prompted courts in any other 
jurisdictions to refashion common law remedies to respond to these risks? 
Only recently a California court, weighing the negligence and strict tort 
liability cases arising from a San Francisco law firm office massacre, found 
that the victims' claims against the manufacturer of the semi-automatic 
assault weapon used in the killings could be pursued under California law 
of ultrahazardous a~t ivi t ies . '~~ 
C. Specific Demonstrations of Common Law Polycentric Justice 
Numerous other examples exist of common law developments that 
successfully redress societal need, and which do so where legislatures have 
ceded the terrain to common law growth, or have failed to act for want of 
broad-based political will to do so. These common law developments each 
manifest, in varying degrees, some or each of the central propositions of 
judge-made law: corrective justice, morality, instrumentalism, efficiency, 
and capacity for growth. 
1 .  Comparative Fault 
The common law rule of contributory negligence precludes a plaintiff 
from recovery for wrongfully caused harm where the plaintiffs lack of 
ordinary care for her own safety contributed to that harm.I8' An early and 
influential expression of both the rule and its perceived logic was given in 
ButterJield v.  orr rester,'^^ the early nineteenth century decision where the 
plaintiff rode his horse into a pole left in the road by defendant. Lord 
Ellenborough explained the court's logic in denying judgment for plaintiff: 
A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made 
by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do[es] not himself 
useless for the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, sport, and protection of persons, 
property and businesses." Id. at 1 153-54 
183. MD. CODE ANN. art. 3A, 5 36-I(h) (1992). 
184. In re 101 California Street, No. 959316, 63 U.S.L.W. 2652 (BNA) (Cal. Super. Ct. 
April 10, 1995). 
185. 2 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 13.1 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995 
with K. Northern). 
186. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  1 8  UALR L. J. 595 1995-1996 
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18 
use common sense and ordinary caution to be in the right. . . . One 
person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care 
for himself. 18' 
The defense's logic and application was widely embraced by a 
nineteenth century judiciary that was solicitous of early industry's desire to 
avoid hobbling liability rules, as well as by its conceptual reluctance, or 
incapacity, to contemplate that a harm might have more than one proximate 
Whatever might endure of the contributory negligence doctrine's 
original and facial logic, it can be seen to be in conflict with principles of 
corrective justice, instrumentalism and efficiency. For a plaintiff to be 
stripped of any remedy whatever due to any substandard conduct on his 
part, however inconsequential, permits considerations of formalism, even 
scholasticism, to ovemde fairness. The orthodox rule of contributory negli- 
gence also fails to serve instrumental goals. It over deters a plaintiffs 
behavior by seemingly offering only the unillurninating admonition "don't 
do anything that might later be considered wrong," while providing no 
intelligible encouragement of useful conduct. For the potential defendant, 
contributory negligence under deters, by providing the message that for a 
substantial number of the defendant's wrongfully-caused harms, it will avoid 
all liability by a mere showing of some incautious conduct of plaintiff. 
Lastly, the contributory negligence rule is inefficient, as it contains no 
obligation to apportion the cost of detecting and ameliorating risk along the 
lines of the parties' comparative causal contribution to the loss. In this way 
it imposes substantial external costs upon parties who are not, with regard 
to the totality of the risk, the cheapest cost avoiders. 
Today, comparative fault, in either its pure or its modified form, is 
"firmly entrenched in American law."'89 Where not implemented by 
statute,'90 the doctrine of pure comparative fault is a model of an efficient 
common law rule. By levying accident costs upon participants in proportion 
187. Id. at 927. 
188. Mary J: Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative 
Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 284 & n.5 (1994) (citing Fleming S. 
James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Wex S. Malone, The 
Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946)). 
189. See Michael Steenson, Comparative Negligence in Minnesota, 9 WM. MITCHELL . 
REV. 299, 303 (1983), for a valuable exposition of the legislative and judicial enactment of 
comparative fault in Minnesota and other states. 
190. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 456 A.2d 894, 906 (Md. 
1983)(Davidson, J., dissenting) ("In this country, 39 states have abandoned the doctrine of 
contributory negligence and have adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence--3 1 by 
legislative enactment and 8 by judicial decision."). 
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to their causal contribution to the harm, pure comparative fault fairly 
apportions the cost of accident prevention, and the burden of failing to 
prevent accidents, between the actor and the victim. The comparative fault 
approach also achieves the binary instrumental role lacking in pure 
contributory negligence in that the rational actor, no longer completely 
exculpated by even a small level of substandard behavior on the plaintiffs 
part, will govern her conduct in the knowledge that as the author of an 
injury-causing activity, she will bear some, and more often than not most, 
of any indemnification obligation. 
2. Criminal Law 
The dynamism of the common law is revealed not only in matters of 
civil litigation, but also in criminal law. Maryland courts have shown 
particular intrepidity in discarding common law doctrine that has outlived 
its logic or utility, i.e., law that no longer serves the public welfare. For 
example, in Pope v . State,Ig' the court abandoned the common law doctrine 
of misprision of a felony. While the passage of time without any significant 
employment of the doctrine does not, without more, require its abandon- 
ment, the court conceded that "non-use, we believe, is not without 
significance. When an offense has lain vi,rtually dormant for over two 
hundred years, it is difficult to argue that the preservation of society and the 
maintenance of law and order demand recognition of it."Ig2 On substantially 
similar logic, in Jones v. State Ig3 the Maryland Special Court of Appeals 
abrogated the common law rule "that an accessory could not be convicted 
of a greater crime than that of which his principal was convicted."194 
191. 396 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1979). 
192. Id. at 1074. The court went on to explain: "[m]isprision of a felony at common 
law is an impractically wide crime, a long standing criticism which remains unanswered. . . . 
It has an undesirable and undiscriminating width." Id. 
193. 486 A.2d 184 (Md. 1985). 
194. Id. at 185. In so doing, the court offered this reasoning: 
[mlerely because the evidence in the principal's trial may have been different, or the 
principal may have agreed to a favorable plea bargain arrangement, or the jury in 
the principal's trial may have arrived at a compromise verdict, is not a good reason 
for allowing the accessory to escape the consequences of having committed a 
particular offense. 
Id. at 188. 
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3 .  Immunities 
a. Spousal 
The common law rule precluding one spouse from suing the other was 
derived from the legal fiction that husband and wife were "one person in 
law,"195 a fiction described as an "outgrowth of "various legal disabilities" 
that were placed upon women, and which also included the vesting, upon 
marriage, of a married woman's personal property with that of her husband, 
a wife's incapacity to make contracts in her own name, and the husband's 
entitlement to his wife's services.'96 
Courts evaluating the common law question of whether or not to retain 
the rule of spousal immunity provide particularly revealing examples of 
courts' interest and willingness to adopt the better rule of law as reflected 
in the decisions of courts and legislatures of other states. Shook v. CrabbI9' 
was an Iowa general aviation wrongful death claim that followed an accident 
in which the husband, as pilot, and the wife, as passenger, perished. The 
suit was brought by the estate of a wife against the estate of her husband, 
and claimed that while he may have been a good husband, he was a poor 
pilot. Iowa at that time observed spousal immunity, a doctrine immunizing 
a spouse from tort actions arising from the non-intentional torts of another, 
a policy arising from the same legal fiction of husband and wife unity 
mentioned above. 
The Iowa court prefaced its comments with this statement: 
[Wlhen a doctrine or rule is of judicial origin, we would "abdicate our 
own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to 
reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule." An appellate 
court would be remiss in its duties if it did not from time to time 
reexamine the analysis underlying its precedents.I9' 
Deciding to abrogate the common law doctrine, the court was influenced by 
its review of the law of other jurisdictions, which "evidence[d] a definite 
trend toward abolishing in toto or limiting in part application of the doctrine 
195. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being 
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated 
and consolidated into that of the husband. . . . If the wife be injured in her person or her 
property, she can bring no action for redress without her husband's concurrence." 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442-43, quoted in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 
507 (Md. 1983). 
196. Condore v. Prince George's County, 425 A.2d 10 1 1 ,  1013 (Md. 198 1). 
197. 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979). 
198. Id. at 617 (citations omitted). 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  1 8  UALR L. J. 598 1995-1996 
19961 THE VITAL COMMON LAW 599 
of interspousal immunity due to the hndamental policy consideration of 
providing judicial redress of an otherwise cognizable wrong."'99 
4. Tort 
a. The Common Law Relation to the Due Process and Takings 
Clauses 
Modern tort law is generally agreed to be "the offspring" of the 
fourteenth century "action on the case."200 It is a fitting genealogy, for as 
"action on the case" freed the ancient remedy in trespass to redress more 
subtle and indirect injury in an increasingly interdependent and urbanized 
English society,201 so modem tort law continues to mediate claims for civil 
wrongdoing that are at the margins of modem life. 
The common law role as the engine of corrective justice is seen in bold 
relief where Constitutional remedies either fall short or are an incomplete 
arbiter of Constitutionally-addressed liberty or property interests. The 
common law's past role, and its future potential, as a surrogate avenue for 
claims stymied by interpretation of Due Process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment is evidenced in holdings on constitutional claims involving such 
varied settings as (1) a public official's failure to act permitting injury to a 
person remanded in some measure to their care; (2) an official reproval that 
has defamed a private individual; and (3) school-administered corporal 
punishment of a student. 
The common law has reflected a societal recognition that new 
circumstances require new responses. One such common law initiative is 
evidenced in Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California,2o2 in which the 
California Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances "a 
psychotherapist has a duty to protect third parties from a threat of serious 
harm posed by a patient under his care."203 
199. Id. at 618 (collecting authority of 34 jurisdictions). More generally, gender-based 
immunities continue to fall by the common law wayside. As Professor Larry Levine has 
written, "[iln many instances, duty determinations reflect a judge's views of society's 
paramount interests at a specific time. Thus, the duty determination is a dynamic and 
evolving concept." JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE, M. STUART MADDEN, 
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 5 304[C], 57-59 (1996). 
200. FIFOOT, HISTORY, supra note 81, at 3. 
201. See Stanley v. Powell, 1 Q.B. 86 (1891); JOSEPH W. LITTLE, TORTS: THE CIVIL 
LAW OF REPARATION FOR HARM DONE BY WRONGFUL ACT 14 (1985). 
202. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
203. Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard 
Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976). 
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In contrast with Tarasoflare the results reached within the confines of 
statutory or constitutional language. For example, in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social brought on behalf of 
a four-year-old boy repeatedly beaten by his father until he lapsed into 
irreversible retardation, appointed representatives for the injured child were 
rebuffed in their suit claiming that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated by social workers' systematic failure to protect the 
child. The Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
[Nlothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
state to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against 
invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the 
State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of 
safety and security."205 
A like example of the common law of tort's role filling the gaps in 
Constitutional remedies is shown in private litigation challenging the 
occasional and churlish municipal practice of using public posting, to 
discourage so-called "active" shoplifters. In Paul v. Davis;O6 Davis, the 
petitioner, sought an injunction against Louisville, Kentucky police to stop 
their circulation to Louisville merchants of a flier to that effect. Although 
prosecuted for the offense more than once, Davis had never been convicted 
of shoplifting. He claimed in his lawsuit that the fliers inhibited him "from 
entering business establishments for fear of being suspected of shoplifting 
and possibly apprehended, and would seriously impair his future employ- 
ment opportunities,"207 constituting a deprivation of his Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process liberty interest. 
The Court rejected the Due Process claim, holding that a right to one's 
reputation, standing aloneY2O8 did not invest in Davis any liberty interest that 
would trigger procedural Due Process guarantees. Rather, the Court con-' 
cluded, his remedy, if any, lay in a common law action for libel, explaining 
that "his interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the state 
204. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
205. Id. at 195. 
206. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
207. Id. at 697. 
208. The Court contrasted Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), granting 
Due Process relief to a woman subjected to official posting in liquor stores forbidding sale 
of alcoholic beverages to her for a period of one year, as involving an actionable deprivation 
of a "right previously held under state law--the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common 
with the rest of the citizenry." Paul, 424 U.S. at 708. 
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may protect against .injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for 
vindication of those interests by means of damages actions."209 
Lastly, in circumstances of school-administered corporal punishment, 
the Supreme Court has held that the common-law claim of tortious battery, 
and the ancient limited privilege of school administrators and teachers to 
administer corporal punishment, together act as both a shield and a sword. 
In Ingraham v. a procedural Due Process and an Eighth Amend- 
ment "cruel and unusual punishment" challenge to school corporal 
punishment, the Court conceded that physical punishment involved a 
"constitutionally protected liberty intere~t."~" Even so, the Court concluded, 
the constitutional claim was obviated by the presence of "common law 
constraints and The Court explained "Were it not for the 
common-law privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal 
punishment on children in their care, and the availability of traditional 
remedies for abuse, the case for requiring advance procedural safeguards 
would be strong indeed."213 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court, evaluating the 
Takings Clause limitations upon a state's land use authority, held that "[alny 
limitation so severe [as to prohibit all economically beneficial use of land] 
cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must 
inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the 
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land owner~hip."~'~ 
The Court's guideline invites, but does not require, the interpretation 
that continued development of the law of public nuisance as it affects land 
use will be closely reviewed for Takings Clause concerns, at least where the 
owner can make the claim that the state's interpretation of permissible land 
use operates to deprive the owner of all or practically all beneficial use of 
the land. In so doing, the Lucas Court reaffirmed the vitality of the 
common law of public nuisance as permitting, generally, continued state 
prohibition of uses historically found to be public nuisances. Without, 
perhaps, intending to do so, Mr. Justice Scalia simultaneously preserved the 
209. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712. 
210. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
2 1 1 .  Id. at 672. 
2 12. RONALD . ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 378 (4th 
ed. 1993). 
213. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674. 
214. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1993). Regarding public nuisance, Professor John Humbach 
has written that "[tlhe common law of public nuisance is, if anything, even more 
indeterminate than private nuisance in the range of behavior to which it can potentially 
apply." John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 
COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 1 ,  12 (1993). 
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role of the common law of nuisance, trespass, and liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities as pivotal in future land use regulation. By finding 
constitutionally unobjectionable those land use restrictions footed in ancient 
public nuisance prerogatives of regulators, the Court ensured for the time 
vigorous refamiliarization, by regulators and developers alike, with the metes 
and bounds of these common law doctrines. Hopefully, the ongoing 
Restatement (Third) of Torts project will closely evaluate the effect of Lucas 
upon common law development of public nuisance. 
b. The Adaptive Quality of Common-Law Remedies 
An exemplary demonstration of the adaptive ability of the common law 
is in the development of the cause of action for negligently inflicted 
emotional distress. In an early decision permitting such recovery to a 
woman who rationally feared future cancer from a severe radiodermatitis 
that followed excessive radiation treatments for bursitis, the New York Court 
of Appeals in Ferrara v. Ga l l~ch io ,~ '~  while conceding the "valid objec- 
tions" that such a cause of action created the risk of "vexatious suits and 
fictitious claims,"216 concluded, nevertheless, that "[flreedom from mental 
disturbance is now a protected interest in this State."*" 
Courts continue to "exhibit significant concern over whether claims for 
emotional or mental distress are The traditional common law 
rule provided that damages for emotional distress occasioned by mere 
negligence required "impact" or evidence of physical injury.219 As the early 
decision in Ferrera explained, 
[nlot only fright and shock, but other kinds of mental injury are marked 
by definite physical symptoms, which are capable of  medical proof. It 
is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and 
deny it when there is nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for 
some guarantee of  genuineness.220 
In many jurisdictions, the "impact" rule has been loosened to permit tort 
recovery where plaintiff "actually feared for her own safety," the so-called 
"zone of danger" rule.221 The watershed decision in Dillon v. Leg$22 
215. 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958). 
216. Id. at 252. 
217. Id. 
2 18. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 172 (1992). 
219. E.g., Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Little v. 
Williamson, 441 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
220. Ferrara, 152 N.E.2d at 252. 
221. Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201, 1202 n.3 (C.D.S.D. 1983). In Gnirk, 
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involved a claim for damages for a mother who witnessed an automobile 
fatally injure her infant daughter. Rejecting the "zone of danger" rule as 
"hopeless[ly] ar t i f i~ ia[ l ] , "~~~ and denoting "foreseeability of risk" as the 
paramount gauge of the court announced the following approach: 
In determining . . . whether defendant should reasonably foresee injury 
to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a 
duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as  the 
following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the 
accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) 
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff 
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as 
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. 
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted 
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant 
relationship.225 
Dillon stands as an example of the common law's refraction of social 
change. One interpretive ray refracted is modem feminist theory. Specifi- 
cally, feminist theorists have argued effectively that an array of inequalities 
in political p o ~ e ? ~ ~  throughout the common law reflect "male gender 
biaS.v227 Regarding emotional distress claims particularly, the argument 
goes, the distinctions, mandated by the "impact" rule and even its successor, 
the "zone of danger" rule "marginalize the interests of women."228 
Thus, Dillon's enlargement of recovery for fright-based injury operates 
to redefine the "reasonable man" standard of tort law to include the 
reasonable mother. As Professors Chamallas and Kerber explain, "[wlhen 
a mother's fear for her child is acknowledged as a cause of her own 
physical harm we can glimpse the beginnings of a feminization of tort law. 
plaintiff, a mother whose son drowned while strapped in an automobile that, due to a 
defective transmission, shifted from Park to reverse and submerged in a stock dam, was 
permitted to recover even though she was not in the "zone of danger." The court reasoned 
that no such restriction ought apply where she was a "user" of a product, under 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $' 402A, rather than a bystander. 
222. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
223. Id. at 915 (noting that "we can hardly justify" permitting recovery to one witness 
and denying it to another due solely to the "happenstance" of one being "some few yards 
closer to the accident"). 
224. Id. at 919. 
225. Id. at 920. 
226. See THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 
1990). 
227. ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 305 (4th ed. 1995). 
228. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women. Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A 
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990), quoted in RABlN supra note 227, at 307. 
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Relational interests become a constituent feature of one's own physical 
integrity. 33229 
5 .  Contract 
a. Employment 
One of the most extraordinary common law transformations of the legal 
landscape of recent years is that involving employee rights, and the ancient 
doctrine of employment at will. At common law, and unaffected by 
statutory initiative in most states, an employee serves at the will of her 
employer.230 She may be released for any reason, bona fide or otherwise, 
or for no reason at all, "even if such action was purely arbitrary or morally 
suspect."23' Where preserved, the doctrine has been justified in part by the 
logic that the employee's freedom to depart from the employment relation- 
ship at any time requires bestowal of a reciprocal freedom to the employer, 
sometimes referred to as a theory of "mutuality."232 
Recognition of a germinal liberty interest in the continuation of 
employment, absent dismissal for cause or for economic reasons, has led to 
the growth of a tort remedy for "unjust di~charge."~" The remedy, a hybrid 
of tort and contract, is also referred to as "retaliatory discharge" or 
"wrongful termination."234 
229. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 228, at 862. See also, RABIN, supra note 227, at 
318. 
230. The rule was described in HORACE G. WOOD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER 
AND SERVANT (1 877): 
With us the rule inflexible. that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a 
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden 
is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much as a day, week, month, 
or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption 
attaches that it is for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the 
party may serve. 
Id. at 134. 
23 1. TERRENCE F. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE '90s $ 1.18, at 47 
(1990) [hereinafter KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY] . 
232. CJ, Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981) ("Recent 
analysis has pointed out the shortcomings of the mutuality theory. With the rise of large 
corporations conducting specialized operations and employing relatively immobile workers 
who often have no other place to market their skills, recognition that the employer and 
employee do  not stand on equal footing is realistic."). 
233. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full 
Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1978); Sheets v. ~ e d d ~ ' s  Frosted Foods, Inc. 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980). 
234. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY, supra note 231, at $1.18 ("Retaliatory 
Discharge"). 
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The speed of the change has been breathtaking. Only two decades ago, 
employment at will was the practically universal common law rule.235 
Today, judicial decisions in over eight percent of the jurisdictions "have 
unilaterally, and without legislative sanction, expanded their common law 
governing the master-servant relationship to limit employers' discretion to 
terminate employees."236 These common law modifications have relied 
variously upon three approaches: (1) public policy; (2) contract theory; and 
(3) the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.237 
The most conspicuous fissure in the previously monolithic doctrine of 
employment at will has been the so-called "public policy" exception. 
Wisconsin, for example, has redelineated an employee's discharge remedy 
to "balance employers' needs for 'sufficient flexibility to make needed 
personnel decisions' against employees' 'job security interests' and the 
public interest in protecting employee actions that advance 'well established 
public policies. 7,3238 In that state, the "public policy" unjust discharge 
remedy turns upon (1) identification of a specific statutory or regulatory 
policy; and (2) a determination that the employee's discharge resulted from 
his refusal to violate that 
Just what are such "public policies" sufficient to trigger this incremen- 
tal common law foray? Revealing is Wilcox v. Niagara of Wisconsin Paper 
an unjust discharge claim following the firing of Kenneth Wilcox, 
the company's longstanding director of computer operations. In the five days 
preceding his discharge, repair exigencies spurred by a computer malfunc- 
tion caused Wilcox to work some 61 hours, 35 of them on the last two days 
of the workweek. Wilcox, who had heart surgery less than two years 
before, left work that Friday at 9:30 P.M. after experiencing angina pains. 
Later that evening his manager called and told Wilcox he would be 
expected to work both Saturday and Sunday. Wilcox explained his 
situation, and that he still felt ill, but assured his superior the system would 
be functioning by Wednesday, the first day it would be needed. He warned 
Wilcox he would be dismissed if he did not work the weekend. Wilcox 
was hospitalized, and released Saturday with instructions to "take it easy." 
Returning to work Monday, Wilcox did, in fact, see the computer system to 
235. Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at 
Will: The Case Against "Tortijication" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 
(1 994). 
236. Id. (collecting authority). 
237. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY, supra note 231, at 48. 
238. Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Brockmeyer v. 
Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wisc. 1983)). 
239. Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 167, 169-171 (Wisc. 1986). 
240. 965 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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satisfactory functioning by Wednesday. Nevertheless, he was fired the 
following day.24' 
In his ensuing action for breach of contract, Wilcox alleged that his . 
discharge violated the public policy set out in the Wisconsin an 
interpretation the court found to "reflect the public policy of the State of 
p is cons in."^^^ Finding that Wilcox's claim fell "squarely within the bounds 
of the public policy exception," the court explained that "compliance with 
the manager's demand for still more hours over the weekend would have 
required Wilcox to work 'for such a period of time . . . as [was] dangerous 
or prejudicial to [his] life, health, safety or welfare. ,93244 
The public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine is a 
clear-cut example of an efficient judge-made rule. In utilitarian terms, in 
today's employment environment, a discharge based upon an employee's 
refusal to obey an unlawful command works an emotional hardship upon the 
employee, together with potentially devastating economic consequences. 
The benefit to the employer of maintairiing such a prerogative is psychologi- 
cal at most, and of no identifiable social value. Thus a rule discouraging 
such discharges deters wasteful conduct while imposing no material 
workplace or social cost. 
Indeed, the exception to the employment at will doctrine can be 
considered pareto optimal. A rule is pareto optimal when its effects benefit 
all parties, in essence a win-win proposition. The rule discussed is pareto 
optimal, or win-win, in that the employee gains in economic security and 
individual autonomy. The employer gains in that it is more efficient to 
desist in capricious firing practices than it is to defend a regulatory 
enforcement action brought by a state or federal discrimination or labor 
standards unit. Lastly, the broader public welfare is advanced as the 
common law rule works in effective synergy with the statutory goal. 
241. Id. at 357-58. 
242. Id. at 358. See also WIS. STAT. ANN. 5 103.02 (West 1988), which reads in part: 
"No person may be employed or be permitted to work in any place of employment for such 
period of time during any day, night or week, as is dangerous or prejudicial to the person's 
life, health, safety or welfare . . . ." Id. 
243. Id. at 360. 
244. Id. at 363. 
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6 .  Evidence 
a. Spousal Privilege 
It is in the evidence rules and policies governing the spousal testimonial 
privilege that we find a noteworthy example of the common law's 
progressive incrementalism. 
The law of evidence, at both the state and federal level, has been 
subject to pervasive codification. In federal courts, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence specifically excised from their coverage several evidentiary topics, 
notably the evidence rules concerning testimonial privileges, leaving these 
subjects to the substantive law of the states.245 Rule 501 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence enjoins the federal courts to shepard the evolution of 
testimonial privilege in criminal trials "governed by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason and 
experience."246 
The evidentiary rule that a husband or a wife could, by claim of 
spousal privilege, prevent their spouse from giving testimony against them 
in a criminal trial was recited in 1628 by Lord Coke, who stated, "[Ilt hath 
been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against 
or for her husband."247 As the Supreme Court has explained the rule, 
[tlhis spousal disqualification sprang from two cannons of medieval 
jurisprudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify 
in his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the 
concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the woman had 
no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one. From 
those two now long-abandoned doctrines, it followed that what was 
inadmissible from the lips of the defendant-husband was also inadmissi- 
ble from his wife.248 
Identified in modem evidence law as a rule of privilege rather than one 
of disqualification, the modem rationale for a spousal privilege against 
giving criminal testimony against the marital partner "is its perceived role 
in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage re~ationship."~~~ 
Criticized by no less authority than Professor Wigrnore as "the merest 
anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in 
245. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note. 
246. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
247. 1 E. COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628). 
248. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980). 
249. Id. at 44. 
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practice,"250 the Supreme Court in Hawkins v. United States2" nevertheless 
turned back a prosecution request that the privilege be modified to vest only 
in the witness-spouse,252 although it did emphasize that its decision should 
not "foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually be dictated by 
'reason and experience. ' 9,253 
Two decades later, noting the sea change in state evidence rules, 
demonstrating a clear conversion to a more limited privilege,254 and the 
unquestioned ascent of women in the cultural and political perception,255 the 
court in Trammel v. United States held that 
the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has 
a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither 
compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. This modifica- 
tion-vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse-furthers the important 
public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate 
law enforcement needs.256 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Trammel evinces a non-normative 
commitment to principles of justice and fairness, as well as an unspoken 
obeisance to efficiency. By non-normative commitment to principles of 
justice is meant that the court is not noticeably stirred by any distaste for 
felonious, conspiratorial husbands who have embroiled their wives in 
lawless pursuits--although we might forgive the Court had it been. Rather, 
the Court seems to have recognized that anterior to just judicial resolution 
are facts, and that the old rule operated simply as an obstruction of facts.257 
Whether the probandum is criminal culpability or civil liability for money 
damages, liberal access to evidence is the hallmark of modem adjudication. 
As the Court stated in United States v. ~ r y a n , ~ ~ '  "'the public . . . has a right 
to every man's evidence. ,97259 
250. Id. at 45 (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, VIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW $ 
2228, at 221 (3d ed. 1961)). 
251. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
252. By the time of the decision in Hawkins, the American Law Institute's MODEL CODE 
OF EVIDENCE Rule 215 (1942) had rejected the common law rule, as had the UNIF. R. EVID. 
.Rule 23(2). Trammel, 445 U.S. at 45. 
253. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 79. 
254. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 49-50 & nn.9, 10. 
255. Id. at 52. 
256. Id. at 53. 
257. Id. at 44. 
258. 339 U.S. 323 (1950). 
259. Id. at 33 1 (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, VIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW $ 
2192 (3d ed. 1961)). 
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Trammel can also be harmonized with principles of efficiency. In all 
litigation, information costs are considerable. Here, the Supreme Court's 
holding is consonant with an "informational asymmetry policy" described 
by Professor Eisenberg, suggesting that "the applicability of a legal rule 
should not depend upon information that will characteristically be in the 
hands of only one of the parties."260 It likewise conforms to Professor 
Eisenberg's described "opportunism policy," which posits that "legal rules 
should not encourage exploitative conduct."26' 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Has the common law comprised a resolute, patient, faithful and 
effective engine of social change for three hundred years? Has the 
"revolution" on common law judging resulted in a vital, supple common law 
capable of a continued, integral jurisprudential role, a system of law and 
judging to which the public will continue to look to resolve the critical case, 
the case at the perimeters of societal change?262 In the common law is there 
yet reposed our legal system's best instrument for responding to "changes 
r, 263 in social values ? Or has the common law embarked on a course of 
marginalization and irrelevance that will reduce its contribution in the new 
century? 
The New York Court of Appeals put it well in Schenectady 
 chemical^,^^ approving application of the doctrine of public nuisance 
against the generator of waste even though the defendant did not own the 
premises constituting the nuisance: "The common law is not static. Society 
has repeatedly been confronted with new inventions . . . that, through 
foreseen and unforeseen events, have imposed dangers upon 
260. EISENBERG, NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 161, at 28. 
261. EISENBERG, NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 161, at 28. 
262. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 99 (Paul Gewertz ed. 
& Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989). 
Legal uncertainties arise far more when nonlegal norms in society are in 
conflict, . . . . [Conflicts among interest groups] are fact situations that arise 
because the margins of growth keep shifting in real life, and for that very reason 
they shift the law's margins of growth too. . . . The critical case always involves 
a fact situation not from the stable core but from the growth zone of life waiting 
to be regulated. 
Id. (discussed in John R. Nolan, Footprints in the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A 
Practical Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J .  LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 16 (1992)). 
263. Farber & Frickey, supra note 3, at 875. 
264. New York v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1983), 
aff'd as modified 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
265. Schenectady, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 977. In environmental and toxic torts, for example, 
tort law "has addressed various manifestations of uncertainty" with resultant "movement 
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Particularly in the 'twentieth century, with two global wars, there has 
been much to belie any "fiction that society [has] educated itself, or aimed 
at a conscious In my view, our common law represents just 
such an example of a sustained societal pursuit of a common purpose. 
Dispute will always be stimulated by the means selected by a particular 
common law doctrine--especially new doctrine. Should the waistband be 
pulled in as to what constitutes trade puffing? Should child psychologists 
and school administrators be under a duty to report potential child abuse? 
These questions, at the perimeters of our social and business dealings, will 
be resolved only with the passage of time, and with the entry of two or 
three score more common law judgments entered on the basis of individual- 
ized facts and able lawyering. The core of the common law, however, 
represents an unequaled American commitment to personal freedom, 
business opportunity, dignity, and mutual expectations leavened by two 
centuries of cultural development. 
The debate over the proper goals of the common law continues, with 
some arguing that its principal objective should be fairness, while others 
seem to be suggesting that efficiency should reign. In the perception of this 
author and others, goals of economic efficiency and corrective justice 
fairness have proved their compatibility as complementary societal 
commitments supporting the progressive development of common law 
justice. 
What are the potential common law initiatives of the future? Inten- 
tional infliction for emotional distress for racial di~crimination?~~' A 
nuisance-based foundation for land use law that responds to Mr. Justice 
Scalia's instruction that litigants seeking to immunize land use regulation 
enforcement from Takings obligations find a common law nuisance or 
trespass based foundation for the prohibition? An enduring tort response (1) 
to the unconscionable manufacture and distribution of handguns and 
- 
automatic weapons with no plausible purpose other than to kill and maim; 
or (2) to rights of the unborn, with the implications of such doctrine to 
highly-charged political and religious issues? As the twentieth century 
closes, the common law thrives. Its vitality does not depend upon adherence 
away from notions of unicausality and toward systemic or multiple causation and 
accountability." Levit, Ethereal Torts, supra note 218, at 137. 
266. EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS, supra note 42, at 483. 
267. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n. 10 (1974). The "contours of the 
[intentional infliction] tort are still developing, and it has been suggested that 'under the logic 
of the common law development of a law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination might 
be treated as a dignitary tort."' Id. (quoting C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969)), cited in Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 
663 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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to the claims of others that any constraint of existing remedies is unjust. 
Mindful of political pressures, but a thrall to no ideology, the common law 
enters the next century much as it did the last--representing a conjunction 
of ancient principles of corrective justice with modem, developed consider- 
ation of individual autonomy, social efficiency and fairness. 
Observers past and present offer agreement that "in relating law to the 
totality of social relationships it is difficult to feel that America now has any 
A partner, with statutory law, in that system of social justice, our 
common law is more than a legacy of jurisprudence. Progressive, protean 
and dynamic, American common law is a reflection of our society's better 
self. 
268. LASKI, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 66, at 66. 
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